UIC Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 1

Article 5

Fall 1991

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Will the Peremptory
Challenge Survive Its Battle with the Equal Protection Clause, 25
J. Marshall L. Rev. 37 (1991)
Steven M. Puiszis

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the
Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven M. Puiszis, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Will the Peremptory Challenge Survive Its Battle
with the Equal Protection Clause, 25 J. Marshall L. Rev. 37 (1991)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss1/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE CONCRETE CO.:*
WILL THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
SURVIVE ITS BATTLE WITH THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE?
STEVEN M. PUISZIS**
The true rule, in determining to embrace,or rject any thing is not
whether it /has] any evil in i4"
but whether it [has] more of evil, than of
good. There arefew things wholly evil or wholly good. Almost every
thing, especially of governmental policy, is an inseparablecompound
of the two; so that our best judgment of the preponderance between
them is continually demanded. ....Why not apply it then upon this
question?
Abraham Lincoln
From a speech in the U. S. House of Representatives on Internal
Improvements [June 20, 1848].
Experienced trial counsel have at one time or another exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a prospective juror for reasons they could not precisely put their finger on. Was it the manner
in which the juror "slouched" in the jury box or the juror's refusal
to make eye contact? Perhaps it was the loud sports coat that did
not fit the juror's three hundred pound frame. Was it the juror's
unemployment during the past year? Could it have been that the
juror was Irish, Italian, Jewish, a Democrat, a Republican, a schoolteacher, an accountant, or an ex-Marine, and was therefore either
too liberal or too conservative to fit the ideal juror profile? Perhaps
it was that admonition he received from a so-called "behavioral scientist" to never put a housewife on a jury in a "products" case because they too frequently experience appliances that break down at
home.
111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991)
Steven M. Puiszis, B.S.C., 1976, DePaul University; J.D., 1979, Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law, is a partner in the Chicago office of Hinshaw & Culbertson and a former prosecutor in the criminal and special prosecution divisions of the Cook County States Attorney's Office. A prior version was
initially delivered as part of a presentation to the Illinois Association of Defense
Trial Counsel on September 14,1991 at their fall seminar in St. Louis, Missouri.
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Steven
Bonanno, Class of 1992, The John Marshall Law School.
*
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Until the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,1 civil trial counsel by and large
have not had to justify their exercise of peremptory challenges. 2 In
Edmonson, the Supreme Court held that a private civil litigant may
not use peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on account of their race or ancestry. The Court remanded the case to the
district court for a determination as to whether the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of discrimination under the guide3
lines set forth in Batson v. Kentucky.
In light of Edmonson, civil trial counsel will now have to be
prepared to explain why a particular juror was excused from
service on a jury or run the risk of court-imposed sanctions against
the client,4 a reversal of a favorable verdict,5 or a claim that the

1. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
2. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Edmonson, several courts of
appeal had divided on the issue of whether Batson applied to a civil proceeding.
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits held that a private litigant may not use a
peremptory challenge to exclude jurors on account of race. See Dunham v.
Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 F.2d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1990); Fludd v.
Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 828 (11th Cir. 1989). In Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d
1370,1377-80 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated,Ill S. Ct. 2791 (1991) (remanded in light of
Edmonson), opinion on remand, No. 89-35778, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25, 116
(9th Cir. Oct. 29, 1991). In it original opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that a
corporation may not raise a Batson challenge in a civil lawsuit. On remand, the
Ninth Circuit avoided the issue by holding the corporate defendant's objections
were not timely made. 1991 U.S. LEXIS 25116 at *3-8. The Eighth Circuit, in
Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990), held that when
the government is involved in civil litigation, it may not use its peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. See also Chavous v. Brown, 396
S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 1990) (private attorney's use of peremptory challenges did not
involve "state action" and therefore Batson was inapplicable), vacated, 111 S.
Ct. 2791 (1991) (remanded in light of Edmonson), a'ffd, 1991 WL 155762 (S.C.
Aug. 12,1991) (applying Edmonson); McDaniel v. Mutchnick, No. WD 4149, WL
165952 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1990) (cause trans. to Mo. S. Ct) (Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit racially discriminatory peremptory strikes in
civil litigation because no state action involved).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, the Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a prosecutor from exercising
peremptory challenges solely on account of a juror's race or on the assumption
that black jurors, as a group, would be unable to impartially consider the state's
case against a black defendant. Id. at 84. The Batson Court enunciated a threepart test for establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the
selection of a jury. To prevail on a "Batson" challenge a party must demonstrate that: 1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group; 2) members of his
race have been excluded from jury service through the exercise of peremptory
strikes; and 3) these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenge to excuse the venireperson
on account of race. Id. at 94-96.
4. See Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 898 (D. Conn. 1986)
where the court, after finding a Batson violation, dismissed three separately selected juries and imposed court costs and attorneys' fees against the defendant.
See also Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155-56 (7th Cir. 1988) (trial court's
sanction, which included the discharge of a jury already selected and an order
precluding the use of peremptory challenges in connection with the parties'
next attempted jury selection, was vacated on writ of mandamus, due to the
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attorney exercising the challenge violated a Rule of Professional
6
Conduct.
This article analyzes the rationale underlying the Edmonson
decision and discusses the historical progression and expansion of
Equal Protection challenges to the use of peremptory strikes. It
will then acquaint civil trial attorneys with the issues that may arise

in a Batson hearing, should opposing counsel make the argument
that counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges was racially or
ethnically motivated, or should counsel wish to challenge his opponent's use of peremptory strikes.
BACKGROUND OF THE EDMONSON DECISION
In Edmonson, the plaintiff was a construction worker who was
injured in a job site accident. 7 He sued Leesville Concrete Co. in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Edmonson claimed that a Leesville employee caused a com-

pany truck to roll backward and pin him against construction
equipment.8
During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three peremptory
challenges, authorized by statute,9 to remove blacks from the jury.
Edmonson, who was black, requested that the defendant articulate
"race-neutral" explanations for the removal of the two jurors. The
District Court denied the request, holding that the principles of Batson v. Kentucky did not apply to civil proceedings. The jury, which
was comprised of one black and eleven white jurors, returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and assessed his total damages at
$90,000. The jury also determined that Edmonson's comparative
negligence was 80% and reduced his award to $18,000.10
In an opinion driven by the concern that racial discrimination
in the courtroom would raise serious doubts as to the integrity of
concern that the Batson issue might not be preserved if the parties were foreclosed from using peremptory challenges in their next attempt at selecting a
jury).
5. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (1991).
6. Rule 8.4(d) of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. The majority of jurisdictions include this principle within their codes of
professional responsibility. See, e.g., Rule 8.4(a)(5) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, Rule 8.4(a)(5)(1990). A violation
of Batson, if sustained, could warrant a finding that the attorney violated this
rule of professional conduct. See AMERicAN BAR Ass'N/THE BUREAU OF NAT'L
AFFAIRs, Lawyers Manual on ProfessionalConduct (1991).
7. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
8. Id.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1990) entitles each party to three peremptory challenges in a civil lawsuit.
10. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
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our system of justice, the Edronson Court stretched to find the
necessary "state action" to bring a private civil litigant's use of peremptory challenges within the penumbra of the Equal Protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause.1
The Edmonson Court ostensibly relied on the state-action test
outlined in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.12 Under Lugar, a private
actor must rely on "a right or privilege having its source in state
authority" and must be deemed a governmental actor when exercising that right or privilege, before state-action will be found.' 3 Since
the peremptory challenges in question were authorized by statute,
and in view of the fact that there is no constitutional right to the
use of peremptory challenges,' 4 the Edmownson Court had little difficulty in concluding that their use constituted a "right or privilege"
derived from state authority. This conclusion satisfied the first element of the Lugar state-action test.
However, the Court noted that the private use of state-sanctioned procedures does not automatically trigger a finding of stateaction.15 Prior decisions had recognized state-acticn only when private parties "make extensive use of state procedures with the
11. Id. at 2080. The Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection
Clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only to the states. In
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case to Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Bolling Court found that concepts of "Equal
Protection" and "Due Process," which both stem from notions of "fairness," are
not mutually exclusive. Id. at 499. The Bolling Court found that since the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
maintaining racially segregated schools, "it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government." Id. at
500. The Court then held that racial discrimination in the public schools of the
District of Columbia violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
The fact, that the Edmonson decision is based on the Fifth and not the
Fourteenth Amendment is of little importance to state court practitioners. A
long line of decisions have held that the Supreme Court's approach to Equal
Protection claims is the same under either amendment. See, e.g., Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (the gender-based distinction in the federal Social Security Act violates the Equal Protection right secured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 violates the Fifth Amendment's guar-

antee of Equal Protection of the laws); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(state statutory welfare provisions held to violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, while identical federal statutes violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1980).
12. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
13. Id. at 937.
14. Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2083 (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88
(1988) and Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
15. Edrnonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2083-84 (citing Tulsa Professional Collection
Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988).
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'overt, significant assistance of state officials.' "16 In an attempt to
satisfy the second prong of the Lugar test, the Edmonson Court
pointed to the substantial role that the trial judge plays in conducting the voir dire. 17 The Court observed that the trial judge
rules upon challenges for cause, thereby determining which jurors
remain eligible for removal via a peremptory challenge.' 8 The Edmonson Court also noted that the party who exercises a peremptory
challenge "invokes the formal authority of the court, which must
discharge the prospective juror."'19 Thus, the Court concluded that
a private party's exercise of peremptory challenges could not be accomplished without the overt and significant assistance of the trial
judge.20 The Court then attempted to buttress its analysis by noting
that a jury is a "quintessential governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor" 21 and, therefore, private litigants who select
and shape a jury through the use of peremptory challenges achieve
state-actor status.22
The Edmonson Court, having found the requisite state-action,
then applied the rationale of its decision in Powers v. Ohio.z3 The
Court in Powers held that the race-based exclusion of potential jurors violated the excluded juror's Equal Protection rights, and allowed the defendant to raise the Equal Protection claim on behalf
of the excluded juror.24 The Powersdecision recognized that jurors
wrongfully excluded from service on account of their race would
have little incentive to vindicate their rights, given the substantial
economic burden involved in litigation.2 The Powers Court con16. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084 (quoting Tulsa, 485 U.S. at 486, and citing
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)).
17. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084. See also Rosales-Lopez v. United States,
451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (noting that federal trial courts have been accorded
broad discretion in the conduct and regulation of voir dire).
18. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084.
19. Id. at 2085.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2086. The Edmonson Court analogized the jury selection process
to several of its earlier decisions wherein state governments had conferred, to a
private organization, the power to choose governmental officials. When that
occurs, the private organization is bound to choose those officials in a racially
neutral fashion. Id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179,192-93 (1988); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); and Terry v.

Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 481 (1953)).
23. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
24. Id. at 1373.
25. Id. The Powers Court noted several other barriers which might prevent
an excluded juror from bringing suit: that potential jurors are not parties to the
litigation and have no opportunity to be heard during the voir dire; that an excluded juror cannot easily obtain declaratory or injunctive relief and that it
would be difficult for the excluded juror to show the chances for reoccurrence.
Id. In Carter v. Jury Comm'r of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970), the
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cluded, therefore, that persons wrongfully excluded from jury service would be unable to protect their own rights, and granted the
defendant standing to raise the excluded juror's Equal Protection
26
claim.
THE CONTINUED EROSION OF PEREMPTORY CHALENGES

Edmonson is the third in a trilogy of decisions announced last
term which expanded the scope of Batson's Equal Protection challenge to the use of peremptory strikes. 27 The Edmonson decision,
Court granted jurors who were excluded from service, due to racial discrimination, the right to bring suit on their own behalf. The Powers Court observed
that the number of such suits are rare. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372.
26. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
27. As this article was going to publication, the Supreme Court accepted
certiorari in Georgia v. McCollum, No. 91-372, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6467 (Nov. 4,
1991). In McCollum, the Court will address whether Batson applies to a criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges, as has been suggested by many,
following its decision in Edmonson. It is anticipated that the Court, in McCollum, will be asked to address whether a criminal defendant's right to a fair and
impartial trial under the Sixth Amendment and a defendant's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment outweighs the Equal Protection rights
of a prospective juror whose liberty or property is not at risk and who is not on
trial.
While there is no constitutional right to a peremptory challenge (see cases
cited in supra note 14 and accompanying text), criminal defendants have been
granted its use since at least the 14th century in England, and the peremptory
challenge has been a part of our common and statutory law since that time. See
infra note 34. In Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) the Court
described the peremptory challenge as "one of the most important of the rights
secured to the accused" and condemned any system that would prevent an accused from the full and unrestricted exercise of those challenges.
Although a criminal defendant's right to a peremptory challenge is not explicit in the text of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment, it can be argued that
an accused's right to the unfettered use of peremptory challenges is implicit and
fundamental to the American tradition of trial by jury, much in the same way
the Supreme Court found the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirements applicable to civil proceedings in Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946). See infra note 38; Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (1965) (peremptory challenges are a necessary part of a trial by jury).
In McCollum, two concepts central to our American system of justice will
be at loggerheads; a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial versus a citizen's right to be free from discrimination based on the color of his skin or ethnic
heritage. Since the purpose of the peremptory challenge is to eliminate partiality on both sides, as the Court observed in Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20, the McCollum Court may be requested to carve out a limited exception to Batson for
criminal defendants tried under conditions such as in McCollum.
In McCollum, the crime involved racial overtones, and there was significant
pre-trial publicity concerning a boycott by members of the victim's race against
the defendant's store where the crime took place. Prospective jurors were exposed to this pre-trial publicity which could have had an impact on thier deliberations in a racially charged setting. Georgia v. McCollum, 405 S.E 2d 688 (Ga.
1991).
It can be argued that strict adherence to Batson's principles in this type of
setting actually lessens the protections enjoyed by blacks or ethnic minorities in
the courtroom. The Swain Court noted that it is the availability of peremptory
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which extended Batson's holding to civil cases, was preceded by
Powers v. Ohio.2 8 In Powers, the Court allowed a white defendant
in a criminal case to challenge the discriminatory use of peremptory
strikes against black jurors.2 9 The Powers decision narrowed Batson's three-pronged test by eliminating the requirement that a
party raising a Batson challenge show that members of his race
have been improperly excluded from jury service. 30 In a plurality
opinion announced shortly before Edmonson, the Court in Hernandez v. New York 3 l appears to have extended Batson's coverage
to the exclusion of "Latino" jurors by reason of their ethnic heritage.32 The Court's decision in Edmanson continues Batson'sa3 erosion of the historical role which the peremptory challenge has
challenges which allows defense counsel to ascertain the possibility of juror bias
through voir dire and facilitates the exercise of challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror's hostility that might result from probing questions by counsel. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20. What about a black defendant on
trial before an all-white jury in Mississippi? Presumably, those jurors during
voir dire stated they could be fair and impartial. However, a number of lower
courts have recognized that a party has a right to disbelieve a juror's answers on
voir dire in deciding whether to exercise a peremptory challenge. See infra
note 141 and accompanying text. A strict application of Batson in this situation
could result in the selection of a jury about which a black defendant would not
feel comfortable. All trial counsel have experienced situations where jurors
who fit their ideal "profile" stated they could not be fair and impartial, simply
to remove themselves from the jury. The converse may be true as well.
Batson and its progeny are concerned with the elimination of "overt" discrimination in the courtroom that arises from the use of racially motivated peremptory challenges. However, a rigid application of Batson's principles to
criminal defendants in certain settings can potentially result in a "covert" form
of racial bias directed against the accused on trial. The question that the Court
must address is whether the juror or the accused on trial in this type of setting
would suffer the greater harm from that potential discrimination. Jurors improperly excluded from service due to racial discrimination have been afforded
the right to bring suit on their own behalf. Carter v. Jury Comm'r of Green
County, 395 U.S. 320, 329 (1970); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
Therefore, the "potential" impact of that discrimination on a juror cannot compare to the "potential" harm that an accused could suffer at the hands of a
racially skewed jury.
If the Court recognizes that in certain situations, such as in McCollum, a
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial could be jeopardized by not allowing the accused the right to an unfettered use of peremptory challenges due
to the nature of the crime involved and the surrounding conditions under
which the trial takes place, it faces a difficult task in carving out a limited exception that will not swallow Batson while still adhering to the principle that
racial discrimination has no place in the courtroom.
28. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
29. Id.
30. For a discussion of the Batson three-pronged test, see supra note 3.
31. 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991). For a fuller discussion of Hernandez and its impact on Batson, see infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
32. The Hernandez Court stated:
Petitioner... asks us to review the New York State Court's rejection of his
claim that the prosecutor in his criminal trial exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos from the jury by reason of their ethnicity. If
true, prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory strikes would violate
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played in the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence. 34 The
Supreme Court has sent a clear signal that the Equal Protection
clause prohibits the use of peremptory challenges based on a juror's
race, ancestry,as or ethnic heritage.
Despite this expansion in the scope of Batson's protections, the
Supreme Court continues to recognize the important role which the
peremptory challenge serves in the trial process. Several lower
the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted by our decision in Batson V.
Kentucky.
Hernandez,111 S. Ct. at 1864 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Hernandez was a plurality opinion of the Court. Four Justices (Kennedy,
Rehnquist, White and Souter) found that an explanation given for the exclusion
of two "Latino" jurors was "racially neutral." Id at 1868. In a concurring opinion, Justices O'Connor and Scalia concluded that since the finding of the trial
court was not "clearly erroneous," the Court's inquiry should end, and that the
plurality opinion went further than necessary in assessing the constitutionality
of the prosecutor's asserted reasons for the exercise of his peremptory challenges. Id. at 1873-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Had the HernandezCourt not intended to extend the protection of Batson
to classifications based on ancestry or ethnic heritage, there would have been no
need for Justices O'Connor and Scalia's concurring opinion. Implicit in the Hernandez opinion is the understanding that Batson's protections prohibit the exclusion of jurors based upon their ancestry or ethnic heritage.
33. Batson itself represented a dramatic reversal from prior Court decisions. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1964), the Court found that the
Constitution did not require an examination of a prosecutor's reasons for the
exercise of peremptory challenges in a given case. The Court held that there
was a presumption that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was intended to obtain a fair and impartial trial. The presumption was not overcome
even by a showing that all blacks were removed from a jury because of their
race. Id. It was only when the defendant could demonstrate that blacks had
been systematically removed from juries repeatedly in the past that the presumption might be overcome. Id. at 223-24. In Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1890), the Court noted that peremptory challenges are exercised without the need to state a reason for their use; that they are beyond the court's
inquiry and not subject to a court's control. Their use is often based upon the
"sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon
the bare looks and gestures of another." Id.
34. The peremptory challenge appears to have its origins in The Ordinance
for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1 Stat. (1305) and "became the settled law of England ....
until after the separation of the colonies," and remains the law of England today. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213 n.12 (citation omitted). In the United States, Congress passed the Act of 1790, Ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 119, which entitled a defendant
to thirty-five peremptory challenges in trials for treason and twenty in trials for
other felonies punishable by death. Id. at 214. In 1865, Congress passed 13 Stat.
500, which granted the government five peremptory challenges and the defendant twenty challenges for cases involving capital offenses and treason. Id. at
214. For a thorough history of the peremptory challenge, see Jere W.
Morehead, ProhibitingRace.Based Peremptory Challenges: Should the Principle of EqualProtectionbe Extended to PrivateLitigants?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 835-37
(1991).
35. In Edmonson, the Court stated that, "if a litigant believes that the prospective juror harbors the same biases or instincts, the issue can be explored in
a rational way that consists with respect for the dignity of persons, without the
use of classifications based on ancestry or skin color." Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991) (emphasis added).
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courts have suggested that Edmonson will ultimately lead to the
abolition of the peremptory strike.3 However, the Court had the
opportunity to eviscerate the use of peremptory challenges in Holland v. Illinois,37 and chose not to do so.
In Holland, the Court rejected the argument that the "fair
cross section requirement" of the Sixth Amendment 38 should apply
to the use of peremptory challenges or "require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires to reflect the composition of the
community at large." 39 The significance of the Holland opinion lies
in the fact that a "fair cross section" challenge does not require evidence of a discriminatory intent. All a petitioner must demonstrate
to establish a prima facie violation is a mere statistical under-representation of a "cognizable group" in a jury pool. 4° Thus, the Hol36. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Mutchnick, No. WD 41498, 1990 WL 165952 (Mo.
Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1990) (en banc).
37. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
38. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part- "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ....

"

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

The "fair cross section requirement" was found implicit in how an "impartial jury" is assembled. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). It was
intended to prevent a state from "stacking the deck" in its favor by the manner
it draws up jury lists or compiles a pool of prospective jurors. Holland,493 U.S.
at 807.
To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement of
the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner must show: (1) that the group allegedly
excluded from jury service is a "cognizable" or "distinctive" group in the community;, (2) that the level of representation of that group in the venires from
which juries are selected is not fair or reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community; and (3) that the under-representation in petitioner's venire is due to the systematic exclusion of the group from the juryselection process. Holland,493 U.S. at 478-79.
The application of the Sixth Amendment and its fair cross-section requirement to civil jury trials is not explicit in the text of the amendment, but is
widely accepted, based on the Supreme Court's statement in Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946), that "[t]he American tradition of trial by jury,
considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily
contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community."
However, the decisions cited as authority by the Court in Thiel only involved
criminal matters. At least one court has observed that in Thiel, the Court
rested its decision on its administrative powers over the federal court system,
and did not specifically reach the constitutional issue with regard to both civil
and criminal trials. See, e.g., Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska
1973). While the authority supporting Thiel's holding appears murky, the concept that civil jury pools should be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is well-rooted in our common law and is based on notions of fairness.
Therefore, its application in civil cases has firm support in the Constitution and
Bill of Rights, although its precise constitutional foundation may not be completely clear.
39. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986)).
40. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
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land opinion demonstrates that the Supreme Court still requires
evidence of intentional discrimination to establish a prima facie Batson violation.

41

Furthermore, various courts have extended the protection of
the Sixth Amendment to a number of "cognizable groups" not recognized by Batson.42 The application of the Sixth Amendment in
Holland could have opened the floodgates to Batson challenges
whenever "blue collar workers, Yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts
[or] an endless variety of other classifications" 43 were struck and
likely would have sounded the "death knell" for the peremptory
challenge.
The application of Batson's principles to ethnic minorities was
forecasted by several earlier decisions, one of which found that
"Italian-Americans" constituted a "cognizable racial group" for purposes of a Batson challenge. 44 Yet another decision found that Batson condemned the striking of "Spanish-surnamed" jurors on the
basis of presumed group characteristics. 45 As several of these lower
court decisions observed, the Supreme Court in 1987 had twice
equated the term "race" with "identifiable classes of persons" who
were subjected to intentional discrimination "solely because of their
ancestry or ethnic characteristics" in connection with claims
41. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1865-66, 1873 (1991)
("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.... [A] defendant who alleges an equal
protection violation has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination.") (O'Connor, J., Scalia, J., concurring).
42. See, eg., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (women); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Barksdale v. Blackburn, 610 F.2d 253 (5th
Cir. 1980) (wage earners), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981); United States v.
Brady, 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978) (Indians), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979);
Julian v. State, 215 SE.2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (age, where average age of
jurors was 69); Paciona v. Marshall, 359 N.Y.S. 2d 360 (1974) (students), affd,
319 N.E.2d 199 (N.Y. 1974); People v. Marr, 324 N.Y.S. 2d 608 (1971) (young
adults between the ages of 21 and 29).
43. Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1056 (1986). The Barber Court warned against the recognition of
"young adults" as a cognizable group for purposes of a Sixth Amendment fair
cross-section challenge. Id. at 1000.
44. United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 853
F.2d 89 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989). Contra United States v. Sgro,
816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987). See also Chew v. State, 527 A.2d 332, 347 (Md. 1987),
vacated, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989):
What will be the limits of the logic of Batson?... will the rule of Batson be
available to white defendants and to defendants who would be classified as
members of the Mongoloid race? Will American Indians be treated as
members of the Mongoloid race? Will Hispanics be treated as a distinct
racial group? Will European Spaniards qualify as Hispanics, even without
an Indian component to their racial makeup?
45. Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1155 (Colo. 1987).
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brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.46

In St. FrancisCollege v. A-Khazraji, an Arab-American professor brought a claim under the Civil Rights Act for an alleged denial
of tenure based upon his "race." St. Francis College had contended
that the respondent was a member of the Caucasian race and therefore could not allege the type of discrimination which section 1981
of the Civil Rights Act forbade. 47 The Court, however, rejected the
college's position and held that section 1981 was intended to protect
48
Arab-Americans.
Similarly, in Shaare Tefila Congregationv. Cobb,49 the Court
allowed a Jewish congregation and several of its individual members to maintain a claim under section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act s °
against a defendant who had spray painted the walls of a synagogue
with anti-semitic symbols. The Shaare Tefila Congregation Court
noted that although Jews are now considered Caucasian and not
members of a separate race, that does not mean they cannot constitute a "cognizable group" or be protected from intentional
discrimination. 51
46. Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987).
47. In St Francis College, the Court observed that modern scientific concepts of "race" differ from how that term was understood in the 19th Century
when the Civil Rights Act was passed. See St FrancisCollege, 481 U.S. at 61012. Those who might be classified as Caucasian today were not thought to be of
the same "race" at the time Congress enacted § 1981. Id. The Court pointed to
several 19th Century dictionary definitions of race.
"The 1863 version of the New American Cyclopedia divided Arabs into a
number of subsidiary races, represented the Hebrews as of the Semitic race
and identified numerous other groups as constituting races including
Swedes, Norwegians, Germans, Greeks, Fins, Italians, Spanish, Mongolians,
Russians, and the like. The Ninth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.
also referred to Arabs, Jews, and other ethnic groups such as Germans,
Hungarians, and Greeks as separate races."
Id. at 611-12 (citations omitted). The Court also noted that anthropology currently views there to be three major human races, Caucasoid, Mongoloid and
Negroid and that due to the variability in human beings, some scientists believe
racial classifications have greater socio-political importance than biological significance. Id. at 611 n.4.
48. In St Francis College, the Court held that the respondent could make
out a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, if he could prove he was subjected to discrimination because he was born an "Arab." In his concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan observed that the line between discrimination based on ancestry or
ethnic characteristics, and discrimination based on place of birth or nation of
origin is not a bright one, and that in the Title VII context, the terms overlap as
a legal matter.
49. 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 forbids racially discriminatory interference with property rights.
51. The Powers and Hernandez decisions, which extended Batson's protections to peremptory challenges based on "ancestry" and "ethnic heritage," appear to equate Batson's coverage to groups similarly protected from
discrimination under the Civil Rights Acts. As the Court in St FrancisCollege
observed, "Congress intended to protect from discrimination classes of persons
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The extension of Batson's protections to "white" and "ethnic
minority" jurors can be readily justified. It would be logically inconsistent for the court to limit Batson's protections solely to
"black" defendants and refuse this protection to other races or ethnic groups. It also provides some measure of protection against
changing biological, anthropological, and socio-political concepts of
race. 52 For trial counsel, however, this will only serve to complicate
the jury selection process, since lower courts appear quite ready to
identify new ethnic groups 53 that potentially fall within the coverage of Batson and its progeny.- 4
The extension of Batson to "ethnic minorities" will not, however, obviate the need to undertake the unseemly task of identifying and categorizing the proper ethnic group that a given juror fits
within. Furthermore, the Court's recent decision in Hernandezv.
New York may prove to be a source of confusion for lower courts
having to address this issue.
who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry
or ethnic characteristics." St. Francis College v. Al Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,
(1987) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Powers and Hernandez decisions, see supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 47.
53. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (Mexican-Americans
are a cognizable group, and "Spanish surnames are just as easily identifiable as
race"); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 1987) (American Indians are a cognizable group under Batson); United States v. Bedonie, 913
F.2d. 782 (10th Cir. 1990) (Members of Navajo tribe are a cognizable group
under Batson), cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 2895 (1991); Commonwealth v. 0'ragnon,
449 N.E.2d 686, 691-92 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (French-Canadians have I .-en recognized as a distinctive group, and their deliberate exclusion on the basis of
group characteristics violates Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights), rev'd on other grounds sub. norm, Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 465
N.E.2d 1180 (Mass. 1984) (court reversed because the prosecutor was never
given an opportunity to explain the use of his peremptory challenges); Commonwealth v. Garabedian, 503 N.E.2d 1290, 1292 (Mass. 1987) (Armenians also
are a discrete group under Article 12 of state Declaration of Rights, but defendant failed to establish prima facie case of discrimination).
54. Trial counsel and the courts should be aware that a number of the "cognizable groups" have been identified in connection with Sixth Amendment fair
cross section challenges. Although in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) the
Supreme Court rejected the application of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross
section requirements to the use of peremptory challenges, (see supra notes 2832 and accompanying text), at least one lower court has noted that while there
is an important difference between the meaning of "cognizability" for the two
tests, the criteria used to identify "cognizable groups" under the Sixth Amendment might be helpful in determining whether a given ethnic minority group
should be considered "cognizable" for purposes of a Batson challenge. See
United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), affld, 853 F.2d 89 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989). A cognizable group under Batson
must be: "(1) definable and limited by some clearly identifiab!e factor;
(2) share a common set of ideas, attitudes or experiences; and (3) snare a community of interests, such that the groups interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process." Id. at 100
(quoting United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987)).
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In Hernandez, the plurality opinion of the Court observed that
the parties used the terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" interchangeably
at the trial and appellate levels. In its apparent zeal to extend Batson's coverage to ethnic minorities, the Hernandez plurality
adopted the parties' characterization of the excused jurors as "Latinos." However, the Court failed to address an issue raised by several lower courts: whether immigrants from a number of different
countries should be classified as "Hispanic" or "Latino" when they
do not necessarily share the same "cultural backgrounds," "community of interests" or "ethnic characteristics." As one court has
observed:
If the proposed class were 'Cuban-Americans,' or 'Spanish-Americans,'
or 'Puerto Rican-Americans,' the mental image of the 'cognizable class'
would be easy to discern. Mexican-Americans, for example, were held
to be a cognizable class in United States v. Test. But to lump persons
from so many countries (even continents) together as a distinct class
requires the exercise of considerable philosophical imagination. I do
not believe the persons of Nicaraguan or Salvadoran heritage and persons of Cuban heritage could comfortably equate their cultural backgrounds and attitudes to one another. See United States v. Rodriguez.
Persons of Puerto Rican heritage could not comfortably equate their
backgrounds and attitudes to those persons of Mexican heritage.ss
By accepting the parties' categorization of those jurors excluded from service as "Latino" or "Hispanic," the Court's decision
in Hernandez appears to be at odds with its holdings in St Francis
College and Shaare Tefsla Congregation. In St FrancisCollege, the
Court indicated that individuals of Irish, Italian, German, or Greek
heritage, for example, could individually constitute identifiable
groups that should not be subjected to intentional discrimination
based on their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. The Court in St
Francis College rejected the use of current anthropological-racial
classifications which would have lumped those ethnic groups within
the "Caucasoid" race.ss If this reasoning had been applied in Hernandez, the Court should not have "categorized" as "Hispanic" or
"Latino," jurors whose ancestors may have been born in Spain with
those who may have been born in Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, or
any of the other Central American nations, unless the record
demonstrated that the excluded jurors shared the same "ethnic
characteristics" or "community of interests."
The mere fact that these diverse groups of American citizens
may share a second common language, as mentioned by the Hernandez Court, does not justify a distinction in the protections afforded under the Equal Protection Clause. If a "shared common
55. United States v. Duran de Amesquita, 582 F. Supp 1326, 1328 (S.D. Fla.
1984).
56. For a discussion of anthropological-racial classifications, see supra note
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language" is to serve as a benchmark for lower courts to follow,

then in theory "white" Americans of "French-Canadian" ancestry
could be grouped with "black" Americans of "Haitian" descent.
Such a result is illogical and not what the Hernandez Court
intended.
It is clear the Hernandez plurality was concerned with furnish-

ing guidance as to what factors or characteristics constitute "racially neutral" explanations - for. the exercise of peremptory
challenges. The Court seized upon an opportunity to address an explanation that could have a disparate impact upon a given ethnic
group.57 The Court in Hernandez approved the use of peremptory
challenges on the ground that bilingual jurors might be unwilling to

accept the court's official translation of the trial proceedings. despite the fact that such an explanation could justify the exclusion of

most, if not all, Spanish-speaking individuals from jury service.
However, the Court may have been better served to remand the
case for a determination on the question of whether the challenged
jurors should have been considered on a "collective basis," in order
to evaluate whether the defendant had established a prima facie
case of discrimination.- s
Further, the reference to a prospective juror's surname will not
necessarily aid a court or counsel in their attempts to determine the
ethnic group that a prospective juror properly belongs in. As sug-

gested by several lower courts,59 reliance on surnames might improperly include or exclude women who have married and adopted
57. In Hernandez, the prosecutor excused several bilingual jurors because
their demeanor and responses during voir dire caused him to doubt their ability
to defer to the official translation of the expected trial testimony. Hernandez v.
New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1867 (1991). This same explanation was held to constitute "group bias" and as impermissible explanation in Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 449 N.E.2d 686, 693 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)(criticizing same explanation
because jurors presumably would follow the court's instructions), qff'd sub
nom, Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 465 N.E.2d 1180 (Mass. 1984).
58. See Bartsch v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1297, 1304 (7th Cir.
1987); Gupta v. East Texas State Univ., 654 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 1981). Trial
courts should make findings of fact to provide reviewing courts with a clear
understanding of the basis for a trial court's decision so as to allow "meaningful" appellate review. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bourgesis, 465 N.E.2d 1180,
1187 (Mass. 1984). "Allegations of... violations based on national origin permit
a trial judge to obtain information as to the national origin of members of the
jury pool in order to create a record that enables the judge to rule on the claim
that peremptory challenges are being abused and allows appellate review on an
adequate record." Id. at 1187 n.12.
In the Hernandezplurality opinion, the Court found that since the prosecutor explained the basis for his challenges without awaiting a ruling on v,hether
a prima facie case had been established, and since the trial court had ruled on
the ultimate question of discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the
defendant had met his prima facie burden had been rendered moot. See Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866.
59. See e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 673 F.2d 96, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd
853 F.2d 89 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989).
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the surnames of their spouses. 6 ° Obviously, a prospective juror's
surname is not necessarily a true indication of the juror's ancestry
or ethnicity.6 ' Until the Supreme Court provides additional guidance on this issue, trial counsel and lower courts will be left to
grope with how to properly categorize the ethnic heritage of selected and excluded jurors. Trial counsel should be cognizant of the
apparent dichotomy in the holdings of the Supreme Court and be
prepared to argue the position that is most favorable to their client's
interests.

WuL BATSON BE EXTENDED To GENDER-BASED CHALLENGES?
Justice O'Connor, writing in support of the Court's denial of
the petition for certiorari in Brown v. North Carolina,6 2 stated that
Batson should solely be limited to the racially discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.6 3 In Justice O'Connor's view, Batson and
its progeny are "a statement about what this Nation stands for" and
are "a product of the unique history of racial discrimination in this
country-, it should not be divorced from that context." A number of
lower courts have adopted positions similar to Justice O'Connor's
and refused to extend Batson's application beyond racial or ethnic
discrimination." Several jurisdictions have even gone so far as to

hold that a party's attempt to achieve a "more gender balanced
jury" is a permissible explanation for challenging minority jurors
60. People v. Ortega, 202 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
61. See Ortega, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (excluded prospective juror with a
Spanish surname was not "Hispanic" but Indian). See also Commonwealth v.

Gagnon, 449 N.E.2d 686, 691-92 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (a member of the venire
who had a Gallic last name was of French-Canadian ancestry), affd sub nom.,
Commonwealth v. Bourgeois, 465 N.E.2d 1180 (Mass. 1984).
62. 479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986).
63. I& at 942.
64. United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (4th Cir. 1988) (government's explanation that three black women were excluded, not because they
were black, but because they were female, was a sufficiently race-neutral reason); State v. Adams, 533 So, 2d 1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (declining to
extend Batson beyond purposeful racial discrimination); State v. Clay, 779
S.W.2d 673, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (Batson would not be extended to peremptory challenges of women); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Neb. 1989)
(refusing to extend Batson to peremptory challenges based on sex discrimination). See also Starkis v. State, 572 So. 2d 1301, 1302-03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(same); Hannin v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462, 463-65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989);
State v. Morgan, 553 So. 2d 1012,1018 (La. Ct. App. 1989), cert denied,558 So. 2d
600 (La. 1990); State v. Pullen, 811 S.W.2d 463, 467-68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); State
v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 867-70 (R.I. 1987). Contra United States v. DeGross,
913 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting gender-based discrimination
against male jurors through the use of peremptory challenges), petitionfor rehearinggranted,980 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Di Donato v. Santini,
283 Cal. Rptr. 751 (Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (Batson applies to gender); People v.
Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (same).
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under Batson.65

Furthermore, in Holland v. illinois,66 the Supreme Court held
that the Sixth Amendment's requirement that the jury represent a
fair cross section of the community does not prevent a party from
exercising peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors of a
cognizable racial group. 67 Holland, thus, also appears to foreclose a
Six.h Amendment fair cross section challenge to the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of gender.
Despite Justice O'Connor's arguments to the contrary, if the
driving force behind Batson and its progeny was the Court's concern that racial discrimination in the courtroom would raise questions about the integrity of our system of justice, a similar argument
can be made as to other forms of discrimination as well. Discrimination against women on the basis of their sex, or against handicapped individuals by virtue of their disability, is no less pernicious
than discrimination based on skin color. However, in light of the
Court's holding in Holland, Justice O'Connor's comments in
Brown,68 and the current philosophical makeup of the Court, it appears questionable whether Batson will be extended to prohibit the
69
use of gender-based peremptory challenges.
Therefore, attorneys wishing to raise a gender-based challenge
to the use of peremptory strikes should also review their state constitutions. New York, Hawaii, and New Mexico have upheld gender-based Batson challenges premised upon their respective state
constitutions.

70

For example, Illinois courts appear to have not yet addressed
the issue of how the Equal Protection Clause found in Article I,
Section 18 of the Illinois Constitution will affect a gender-based Bat65. United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038,1040-41 (4th Cir. 1988); People
v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 697-702 (Ill. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
66. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).

67. Id. at 478.
68. 479 U.S. 940, 941-42 (1986).
69. Unlike racial classifications which receive a strict level of scrutiny
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, gender-based

classifications receive only an intermediate level of scrutiny. A gender-based

classification to be constitutionally permissible must be substantially related to
the achievement of an important governmental objective. See, e.g., Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). In all likelihood, this reduced level of scrutiny will
be one of the factors which the Court may rely upon should it decide not to
extend Batson's protections to gender-based peremptory challenges.
70. See State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990) (excluding jurors
solely on basis of gender violates express provision of Hawaii Consititution);
People v. Blunt, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y.A.D. 1990) (exercising peremptory challenges based solely on gender violates Equal Protection Clause of the New York
Constitution), supplemental opinion 561 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990);
State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40, 47-49 (N.M. 1991) (systematic exclusion of females from jury through peremptory challenges violated Art. II §§ 14, 18 of the
New Mexico Constitution).
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son challenge.7 1 In People v. Ellis, 72 the Illinois Supreme Court
made the following observation about the scope of Illinois' Equal
Protection Clause:
In contrast to the Federal Constitution, which, thus far, does not contain the Equal Rights Amendment, the [Illinois] Constitution of 1970
contains [S]ection 18 of [A]rticle I, and in view of its explicit language,
and the debates, we find inescapable the conclusion that it was intended to supplement and expand the guarantees of the [E]qual
[P]rotection provision of the Bill of Rights and requires us to hold that
a classification based on sex is a 'suspect classification'
which, to be
73
held valid, must withstand 'strict judicial scrutiny.'
Should counsel wish to raise a gender-based equal protection challenge to opponent's use of a peremptory strike, he should include an
argument that the exercise of that peremptory challenge violated
not only the Equal Protection Clause of of the United States Constitution, but also the pertinent constitutional provision in his state
74
constitution.

THE BATSON/EDMONSON HEARING
The Batson Court held that when a party claims that a peremptory challenge was exercised on account of the "race" of a prospective juror, the trial court must hold a hearing to consider the charge
of discrimination and determine whether the exercise of the challenge was racially or ethnically motivated. In Hernandez,the Court

stated that the hearing procedure should allow for "prompt rulings
on objections without substantial disruption of the jury selection

process." 75 Counsel forced to defend a Batson challenge should re71. The Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 18 of the Illinois Constitution provides thatThe equal protection of the law shall not be denied or abridged on account
of sex by the state or its units of local government and school districts.
ILL. CONST., art. I, § 18 (emphasis added).
72. 311 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. 1974).

73. Id. at 101.
74. Since under the Illinois Constitution gender-based classifications receive a higher level of judicial scrutiny than they receive under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the likelihood of successfully raising a gender-based Batson challenge would seem to be greater under the Illinois Equal Protection Clause than
under its federal counterpart.
75. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991). See also United
States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1988) (Batson hearing does not
require trial-type procedures, such as the introduction of sworn testimony and
cross examination); People v. Freeman, Nos. 1-89-2414, 1-89-2500, 1991 Iln. App.
LEXIS 1734 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 9, 1991) (interrogatories directed to a party not
permitted; however, it is within the court's discretion to order production of
"training manuals" and "policies"); People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 453, 460 (Ill.
1989) (rebuttal testimony of co-defendant and trial counsel regarding juror responses not permitted); People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1116 (Ill. 1989) (trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow an expert to testify
for the defense in a Batson hearing).
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quest that the hearing be held outside the presence of the jury to
avoid creating any potential resentment amongst the remaining jurors. Counsel should consider the use of a motion in limine to prevent his opponent from raising the issue in open court, before the
venire, which would only serve to lessen his credibility in the eyes
of the jury.
The procedure for a Batson hearing is similar to the type utilized in Federal Title VII employment discrimination cases. 76 The
burden is initially on the party raising the challenge to demonstrate
a prima facie case of discrimination. If the trial court finds that a
prima facie showing of discrimination has been established, it must
then determine whether the party exercising the peremptory challenges had racially neutral reasons that justified their use.
The burden of persuasion then shifts to the party who exercised the peremptory challenges to set forth "reasonable" and "spe77
cific" explanations that are "legitimate" and "racially neutral.1
During the hearing, the trial judge must consider both the credibility of the attorney and the "race neutrality" of the explanations
given. 78 While the burden of rebutting a prima facie case "is not a
heavy one," a party is required to do more than merely list a series
of factors of characteristics concerning a particular juror.79 A court
cannot presume or infer from the facts that an unarticulated neutral explanation exists which justifies the peremptory challenge.
The court must focus its inquiry specifically on the reasons articulated at the hearing.8 0 'While the reasons given need not rise to the
level of a challenge for cause, the mere assertion of a non-discriminatory motive or good faith will not rebut a prima facie case.81
However, if an explanation corresponds to a valid "for-cause" chal76. Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18, 96 n.19, 98 n.21 (1986). See Peo-

ple v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 381 (111. 1989) (comparing Batson hearing to Title
VII hearing, and finding them similar), cert denied,110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); Sloan
v. State, 809 S.W.2d 224, 226-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (McCormick, J.,
dissenting).

77. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1990), vacated
on othergrounds and remanded,11 S. Ct. 2792; State v. Tomlin, 384 S.E.2d 707,
709-10 (S.C. 1989).
78. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380 (Ill. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
1323 (1990). People v. Freeman, Nos. 1-89-2414, 1-89-2500,1991 Ill. App. LEXIS

1734 (trial judge to weigh credibility of attorney offering explanations, however,
"[r]equiring... [an] oath ought not to be the cutting edge for this task"); State v.

Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert denied, 487 U.S. 214 (1988).
79. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 384 (Ill. 1989) (citing Uviedo v. Steve's
Sash and Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1430 (5th Cir. 1984)), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
1323 (1990).

80. Id.
81. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
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lenge, in all likelihood it will be found racially neutral.8 2 A trial
judge cannot merely accept an attorney's explanations at face value,
but must evaluate those explanations as the court would weigh any
83
disputed issue of fact.
If the trial court determines that the explanations given were
racially neutral, the burden of proof then shifts back to the party
who initially raised the issue.84 That party must then demonstrate
that the explanations were a "mere pretext" for the exclusion of
the juror solely on the basis of his race, ancestry, or ethnic heritage.as At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court has the duty
to weigh the evidence and determine whether the defendant has
established purposeful discrimination.8s
ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF DISCRuiNATiON

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as
originally outlined under Batson, the party challenging the use of
the peremptory strikes must demonstrate that:
The party raising the challenge is a member of a racially cognizable
group capable of being singled out for differential treatment;
The opposing party used peremptory challenges to remove members of

the defendant's race from the venire; and
These facts and "other relevant circumstances8 7raise an inference" of
of race.

purposeful discrimination on the basis

Following the Court's opinion in Powers, a party no longer
must demonstrate that a peremptory challenge was used to remove
a member of his race from the jury. Thus, the Powers decision
eliminated the second element of Batson's prima facie test. as
In determining what "other relevant circumstances" might
raise an inference of purposeful discrimination, courts have looked
to the following factors:
82. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1868 (1991).
In Illinois, challenges "for cause" are provided by statute. In Illinois jurors
must. inhabit the court's jurisdiction; exceed 18 years of age; be free from legal
exception; be of fair character, approved integrity, and sound judgment; and be

able to understand the English language. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, par. 2 (1991).
A juror may be validly challenged for cause if the juror lacks any one of the
qualifications mentioned above, or if he is a party to a suit then pending for trial
in that court or has served as a juror within the past year. Id. para. 14.

83. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert.denied, 487 U.S. 214 (1988).
84. Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101-02 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2875 (1991).

85.
86.
87.
88.

State v. Green, 376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (N.C. 1989).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
Id. at 96.
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991).
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A 8 pattern
of strikes against a specific race or ethnic group of
9
jurors;
An attorney's
questions and statements during the voir dire
9°
examination;
A disproportionate number of peremptory challenges used against
jurors of a specific race or ethnic group;9 1
The level of representation in the venire as compared with
the
92
level of representation in the jury itself of a given ethnic group;
Whether the jurors that were excluded were of a heterogenous
93
group sharing "race" as their only common characteristic; and
The race or ethnic background of the defendant, the victim, the
plaintiff and the witnesses. 4
-

Various courts have commented on the "pattern of strikes" issue in an attempt to provide additional guidance as to the level of
proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under Batson. As one court observed:
A pattern of strikes is not the same as a finished garment of adjudicated discrimination. To create a pattern, strikes should do more than
occasionally involve venire members of a certain race. The strikes
should affect those members to such a degree or with such a lack of
apparent nonracial explanation as to suggest the possibility of racial
motivation; but they need only suggest, because if the strikes and other
relevant circumstances establish a prima facie
case, merely the burden
95
of production is then shifted to the State.
89. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (Ill. 1989) (thirteen of sixteen peremptory challenges were exercised against black jurors),
cert denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
90. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; People v. Mahaffey, 539 N.E.2d 1172, 1184
(Ill. 1989). See also Holley v. J&S Sweeping Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 74, 78 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (prima facie case established when counsel failed to ask any questions of three black minority jurors that were peremptorily stricken). If counsel fails to ask excluded minority jurors certain questions asked of those jurors
he accepted, this is evidence of an improper motive or discriminatory intent.
But see People v. King, 241 Cal. Rptr. 189, 195 (1987) (follow-up questions not
required if they might embarass a given juror or cause resentment among the
other jurors).
91. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 764 (Cal. 1978); People v. Johnson, 557
N.E.2d 565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1164 (N.J. 1986).
92. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93; People v. Holman, 547 N.E.2d 124, 143 (Ill.
1989) (quoting People v. Evans, 530 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. 1988)); Aldridge v. State,
365 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. 1988).
93. See Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 764; People v. McDonald, 530 N.E.2d 1351, 1357
(Ill. 1988); State v. Gilmon, 511 A.2d 1150, 1165 (N.J. 1986) (quoting People v.
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978)).
94. United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), on remand, 848 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1988); People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 698 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990);
Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Colo. 1987); Commonwealth v. McKendrick, 574 A.2d 144, 151 (Pa. Super. 1986), appeal denied, 522 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1987).
95. People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849, 864 (Ill. 1990). See also Phillips v. State,
496 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Ind. 1986) (use of peremptory challenges agaihist black jurors
does not, by itself, raise an inference of racial discrimination).
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Another court has defined a prima facie case as "the minimum
quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that
the allegation is true."
Various reviewing courts have advised their brethren at the
trial court level to avoid arbitrarily deciding this "delicate question"
solely on the number of blacks or minorities peremptorily excused.97 In addition, it has also been noted that the determination
of a prima facie violation should not be based solely on the fact that
a party has used its peremptory challenges to exclude all minorities
from the venire. Such a holding would be inconsistent with Batson's mandate that "all relevant circumstances" be considered. The
trial court should not be precluded from applying its observations
and judicial experience in determining whether an inference of discrimination has been raised.98
However, the exclusion of even one minority juror on account
of his race or ethnic background would mandate a reversal of a
jury's verdict. 99 Furthermore, the fact that one or two minority jurors are ultimately selected for a jury should not affect a court's
analysis. As one court has observed:
[M]erely because two blacks were seated in the jury is not sufficient to
prevent or defeat a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The affirmative racial exclusion of available black jurors by the State which
results in only one or two blacks being seated on the jury is no less evil
and no less constitutionally prohibited than the same procedure which
results in the total exclusion of blacks. No available black person
should be excluded either similarly or systematically from being a ju96. Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), affd, 490
U.S. 754 (1989).
An example of the type of analysis a trial court typically undertakes in
determining whether a prima facie case has been established can be found in
People v. Holman, 547 N.E.2d 124, 144-45 (111. 1989). In Holman, the percentage
of blacks in the venire was roughly 20% (11 of 59), while the percentage of
blacks impaneled as jurors was over 33% (4 of 12). The State excused more
than twice as many white jurors (10) as it did blacks (4). The court further
noted that any racial questions raised by the jury selection process were minimized by the fact that all the victims in the case, like the defendant, were black.
Under these circumstances, a prima facie case of discrimination was not
established.
97. People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 699 (111. 1989), cert denied, 111 S.Ct.
284 (1990); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla.), cert denied, 487 U.S. 214
(1988) (numbers alone not dispositive); Williams v. State, 712 S.W.2d 835, 841
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (there is no quantitative formula with which to guage peremptory challenges against minority jurors).
98. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d at 699; People v. Thompson, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, 755
(1981) (exclusion of a number of black jurors was insufficient in-and-of-itself to
warrant remand of trial court's determinations).
99. United States v. David, 803 F. 2d 1567, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1986); People v.
McDonald, 530 N.E.2d 1351, 1359 (Ill. 1988); State v. Alvarado, 410 N.W.2d 118,
120-21 (Neb. 1987).
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ror solely because he or she is black.1oe

Despite the admonition that courts should not base their decisions solely on the number of excluded jurors, many lower courts
still focus primarily on that factor. If a party uses the bulk of its
peremptory challenges against a given ethnic group, or strikes a majority of a given ethnic group from the venire during the selection
process, a court will generally find that a prima facie case of discrimination has been established.1 0 ' For example, in one case a
prima facie Batson violation was found when three of six challenges
were used against black jurors. 02 Similarly, a prima facie showing
was demonstrated when the only two blacks on a venire were challenged by a party. 0 3 In yet another decision, a defendant established a prima facie case when the state peremptorily struck the
only Hispanic juror in the entire venire. 1°4 Therefore, a practitioner must give careful consideration to every peremptory challenge that is exercised.
RACIALLY NEUTRAL REASONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES

A neutral explanation in the context of a BatsonlEdmonson
hearing is "an explanation based on something other than the race
of the juror."' 0 5 At this stage of the proceedings, the issue involves
the facial neutrality of the attorney's explanation. 1°6 A court
should find the offered reason is racially-neutral, unless a discrimi100. People v. Andrews, 526 N.E.2d 628, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), affd in part
and rev'd in part,548 N.E.2d 1025 (M. 1989). See also Tucker v. Illinois Power
Co., 577 N.E.2d 919 (IMI. 1991) (mere presence of some blacks on jury does not
preclude a finding of prima facie case).
101. See, e.g., People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849, 864 (Ill. 1990) (markedly disproportionate use of strikes against black venire persons established prima facie
case), vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991); State v. Sandoval, 736
P.2d 501, 504 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (prima facie case was established when a
prosecutor removed the only two Hispanics in the venire). Contra Thorne v.
State, 509 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (removal of the only two black
venire persons does not, by itself, raise the inference of discrimination necessary to establish elements of prima facie case), superseded, 519 N.E.2d 566 (Ind.
1988); People v. Harvey, 208 Cal. Rptr. 910, 923 (Ct. App. 1984) (prima facie case
not established where the two challenges did not operate to exclude all members of cognizable class).
102. People v. Harris, 537 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
103. Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497, 502 (Nev. 1987).
104. Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 187, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Contra
People v. Zayas, 510 N.E.2d 1125, 1129 (Il!. App. Ct. 1987) (removal of a single
"Hispanic" juror did not necessitate a Batson hearing), reversed, 546 N.E.2d 513
(1989). See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 101 (1986) (White, J., concurring) (it is not unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more blacks
from a jury).
105. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991).
106. Id.
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natory intent is "inherent in the [attorney's] explanation.' 1 0 7 However, a court will not consider an explanation racially neutral if a
party fails-to exclude members of one racial or ethnic group whose
members possess the same or similar characteristics as another excluded group of jurors and there are no meaningful or distinguishing factors separating the selected and excluded groups of
08
prospective jurors.
The analysis becomes more complex when the explanation justifying the use of a given challenge has a disproportionate impact
upon a particular group of prospective jurors. The Supreme Court
in Hernandez noted that while "disparate impact" should be given
appropriate weight in determining whether an explanation is "racially neutral," it is not conclusive. Unless the attorney adopted the
given explanation or criterion with the intent of causing a disproportionate impact, the explanation does not violate the principle of
race-neutrality merely because, it may impact on a given class of
prospective jurors disproportionately10 9 The plurality opinion in
Hernandez was quick to note that the prosecutor's explanations in
that case rested neither on an intention to exclude "Latino" or bilingual jurors as a group, nor on "stereotypical assumptions" about
those groups of jurors which could evidence a discriminatory
intent." 0
Numerous reviewing courts have addressed the "race-neutrality" of explanations asserted to justify the exercise of a peremptory
challenge. The closer an explanation comes to a valid "challenge
for cause," the more likely a court will find that the explanation is
racially-neutral. 11 ' For example, courts have consistently found
107. Id.

108. People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (fli. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1093 (1990). See Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 514 (8th Cir.1987) (black jurors
excused because of their level of education but white jurors with less education
not challenged), cert. denied, Jones v. Garrett, 484 U.S. 898 (1987); People v.
McDonald, 530 N.E.2d 1351, 1358-59 (M11.
1988) (State excused several black jurors due to their advanced age and occupation yet permitted white jurors who
were older than the black jurors excused and similarly employed).
109. Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867. See also, United States v. Montgomery,
819 F.2d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 1987) (defendant failed to establish a prima facie case
even though black jurors were excused at more than twice the rate which proportionate use of challenges would have caused).
For example, if an attorney attempted to justify the removal of prospective

jurors because they commonly read Ebony or Jet magazine, in view of the fact

that those publications are directed principally towards a black audience, counsel could not legitimately argue that the criteria allegedly justifying the challenge of those jurors was not intended to result in the removal of black jurors.

The intent to discriminate could definitively be inferred. Under the rationale of

Hernandezas well as Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979), such an explanation is not racially neutral.
110. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1867 (1991).

111. Id. at 1868.
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that a prospective juror's criminal conviction,11 2 or prior arrest by
the same police agency in the case on trial,1 1 3 are racially neutral
explanations which justify the removal of that juror. Similarly, the
fact that a juror's relative had been a defendant in an unrelated
criminal trial,1

4

or that a juror had a reputation in the community

for unlawful activities, have been held valid explanations for the
11 5
exercise of a peremptory challenge.
Other racially neutral explanations often involved specific factors in a prospective juror's background that might cause the juror
i 6
to identify with, or be sympathetic towards one of the parties."
For example, the fact that a prospective juror or one of the juror's
children is of a similar age to one of the parties on trial is a racially
neutral ground for a peremptory challenge." 7 Likewise, a juror's
employment or the employment of a close friend in a similar line of
112. People v. Jones, 559 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (juror convicted
of involuntary manslaughter), appealdenied, 561 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1990); Thorne
v. State, 509 N.E.2d 877, 881 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (conviction for operation of
a motor vehicle while intoxicated resulting in a death), superseded,519 N.E.2d
566 (Ind. 1988); Ward v. State, 539 So. 2d 407,408 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). Contra
Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (in the facts of this
case, exclusion of juror based on conviction for disorderly conduct was unquestionably a pretext for racial discrimination), mandamus granted on other
grounds,sub. nom., Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988).
113. People v. Woods, 540 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (juror was
arrested by the same police department which arrested the defendant, and the
police department had treated the juror "rudely"). See also Ivatury v. State, 792
S.W.2d 845, 847-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (juror's prior "false arrest"); Scales v.
State, 539 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Ala. 1988) (prior arrest).
114. See United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) (juro. s
son had been in trouble with the law on prior occasions); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.) (juror's brother convicted of robbery), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 914, 928 (1987); People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 697-702 (Ill.
1989) (brother with robbery conviction), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990); People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380 (IMI. 1989) (relative was a defendant in a criminal trial), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990).
115. United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 1990). In Illinois,
jurors must be of fair character and approved integrity. See supra note 82.
Therefore, several of these explanations should apply with equal force in civil
proceedings as well as in criminal trials.
116. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1488 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Usman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 173 (1990) (juror who previously worked as a
youth supervisor at a correctional center might have tendency to be sympathetic toward defendants; was a valid race-neutral excuse, despite juror's statement that her experience would not prejudice her, and she could be fair to both
sides).
117. People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849, 867 (Ill. 1990) (young male of about defendant's age), vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991); People v. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d 1060, 1069 (Ill. App. Ct.) (juror close in age to defendant), appeal
denied, 564 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1990); People v. Batchelor, 559 N.E.2d 948, 954 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (son near defendant's age), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 840 (Ill.

1990); People v. Taylor, 524 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct.) (young, single, unemployed persons may have tendency to identify with young defendant), appeal
denied, 530 N.E.2d 260 (Ill. 1988); People v. Barker, 446 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. App.
Ct. 1989), affd, 468 N.W.2d 492 (Mich. 1991).
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61

work as one of the parties on trial has also been held a racially neu1 18
tral basis for challenging that prospective juror.
Trial counsel have often developed "perceptions" or "opinions"
about jurors who are employed in certain occupations. Those "perceptions" concerning a juror's occupation can constitute a permissible explanation' 9 for excusing that juror, so long as similarly
employed "non-minority" jurors are also excused, or counsel has a
valid or bona fide reason for not excusing those similarly employed
0
jurors.2
Any experiences in a juror's background or that of a family
member that might tend to cause prejudice toward one of the parties are also valid explanations for the use of a peremptory challenge. 2 1 A prospective juror's occupation that might provide
118. State v. Tubbs, 747 P.2d 1232, 1236-37 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (lack of eye
contact and possible former employment with defendant's employer held raceneutral explanation); People v. Melchor, 535 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (Inl. App. Ct.
1989) (juror's relative and close friend were police officers and the defendant
was a police officer charged with a drug sale).
119. See People v. Ortega, 202 Cal. Rptr. 657, 662-63 (Ct. App. 1984) (social
worker excused because of prosecutor feared the worker might believe that society was responsible for the criminal acts rather than the defendant on trial);
People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849, 867-68 (Ill. 1990) (prospective juror's employment as a drug counselor), vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991);
People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 381 (Ill.
1989) (school teachers and their
spouses excused "because they tend to be sympathetic and musicians because
they tend to be creative and willing to move beyond structures of the law"),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); People v. Jones, 559 N.E.2d 112, (IM. App.
Ct.) (prospective juror's employment as a social worker), appeal denied, 561
N.E.2d 700 (Ill.
1990); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo. 1987) (prosecutor's legitimate "hunches" and "past experience" permissible so long as racial
discrimination is not the motive).
120. See Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 648 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2263 (1991). Barfield involved a discrimination claim based
upon termination of employment. The attorney challenged a black venire person who had been a school board employee because he perceived him to be "pro
labor." However, the attorney did not challenge two white school board employees because the attorney had only one challenge left when all three jurors
were questioned and the selection procedure did not allow for "back striking."
Id. See also Harris,544 N.E.2d at 382 (State had no challenges left to strike
"non-minority" jurors who were employed in occupations similar to "minority"
jurors who were excluded; court held this to be a permissible explanation).
121. See United States v. Ratcliff, 806 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986) (in a
prosecution for tax fraud, prospective juror who taught tax courses and had
"run-ins" with the I.R.S. would be more inclined to view the defense case more
favorably than other jurors), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987); People v. Jones,
559 N.E.2d 112, 115-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (prospective juror was not on friendly
terms with his father who was a police officer, prosecutor was thus concerned
that the juror might therefore be biased against police officers who were expected to testify), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 700 (IMI. 1990); People v. Walker,
547 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (State excluded a prospective juror on
the basis of employment by a law enforcement agency due to the concern that
the bias in favor of the state could jeopardize the fairness of the trial). Contra
Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 690-91 (N.D. Ill.) (police officers on
both sides of the litigation), mandamus granted on other grounds, sub. nom.
Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988). See Bueno-Hernandez v.
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insight into the trial process and allow that juror to substitute his or
her experiences in lieu of the evidence presented or the instructions
given has also been recognized as a racially neutral ground for the
exclusion of that juror.122 Furthermore, a number of decisions have
approved the striking of a juror due to either an unstable job history 23 or a history of unemployment.124
A prospective juror's knowledge or familiarity with one of the
parties, 125 the attorneys,26 or the witnesses expected to be calledm
are all valid race-neutral explanations for the use of a peremptory
challenge. Courts have accepted challenges where a juror has occasionally seen one of the parties in passing,128 or lives in the area
where one of the parties'2 9 or a witness lives.'13 Courts have also
permitted challenges based upon a juror's familiarity with the scene
of an incident or the general area where an occurrence took
State, 724 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 1986) (juror had been sued by the prosecutor's
office in a collection matter), cert denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987); People v. Hope,
560 N.E.2d 849, 866 (Ill. 1990) (in a criminal case, a juror was validly excused
who had been the victim of an unsolved crime and could harbor feelings that
might be held against the police agency or prosecutor's office involved), vacated
on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991).
122. People v. Chambie, 234 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312-13 (Ct. App. 1987) (juror was
a first year law student and defense oriented); People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357,
380 (IM. 1989) (juror's employment involved "interpreting court procedures and
policies"), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107,
1112 (Ill.
1989) (juror employed by well known defense firm as a so called "brief
specialist"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
123. Mack, 538 N.E.2d at 1112 (security guard who frequently changed jobs).
124. Harris,544 N.E.2d at 380 (juror was single, unemployed, and lacked ties
to the community); State v. Martinez, 362 S.E.2d 641, 642 (S.C. 1987) (exclusion
based on unemployed status permitted).
125. See United States v. Jackson, 696 F.2d 578, 593 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073 (1983); Glanton v. State, 376 S.E.2d 386, 387-89 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988) (jurors knew the defendant); State v. White, 535 So. 2d 929, 934 (La. Ct.
App. 1988) (juror knew defendant since childhood).
126. See United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070 (5th Cir. 1987) (defense attorney had worked for agency prospective juror was associated with);
Williams v. State, 507 N.E.2d 997, 998-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (juror had been
previously represented by defendant's lawyer); State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 922,
926 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (juror knew defense attorney's family and recognized
defense council).
127. See Jackson, 696 F.2d at 593 (juror knew six of seven character witnesses); State v. Threet, 407 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Neb. 1987) (one of the witnesses
was known by the juror); Henderson v. State, 360 S.E.2d 263, 265-66 (Ga. 1987)
(jurors knew key witnesses).
128. See People v. Brown, 505 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (juror had
seen the defendant in drinking establishments).
129. See People v. Batchelor, 559 N.E.2d 948 (InI. App. Ct. 1990); Taitano v.
Commonwealth, 358 S.E.2d 590, 592-93 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (four jurors lived
near the defendants, near scene of the crime, or in high crime areas in general).
130. See People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849, 868 (Ill. 1990) (certain witnesses
lived near or in the building where the prospective juror resided), vacated on
other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991).
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place.' 3 ' A prospective juror's social relationships with lawyers and
judges not involved in the case on trial has also been found to be a
132
racially neutral explanation.
Several courts have also approved explanations based upon the
sex or gender of a prospective juror,133 a juror's age,' 3 4 a juror's
marital status 1 3 and even a juror's religious beliefs or preferences.' 3 In addition, courts have upheld peremptory challenges
that are used against a prospective juror if a party or his counsel
137
have had a difficult experience with that juror in the past.

131. See United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 524-25 (8th Cir.) (juror lived
in the area where the alleged crime occurred), cert denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986);
United States v. Biaggi, 705 F. Supp. 867, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (juror lived in
"Little Italy" where important meetings between the defendants on trial took
place), affd, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990); People v. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d 1060,107071 (IMl. App. Ct.) (juror lived within 5 miles of scene of crime), appeal denied,
564 N.E.2d 840 (l. 1990).
132. See People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107,1111-12 (Il. 1989), cert.denied, 493
U.S. 1093 (1990).
133. See United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 1170 (1990). See also People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 701-02 (IMI.
1989) (court permitted the removal of black female jurors to restore a more
gender balanced jury), cert. denied, 1U S. Ct. 284 (1990). But see United States
v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (held that Batson applies to gender
based discrimination and condemned the use of peremptory challenges against
male jurors), rehearinggranted, 930 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1991).
134. Harrel v. State, 555 So. 2d 263, 268 (Ala. 1989) (age may serve as a raceneutral explanation); People v. Moss, 233 Cal. Rptr. 153,161 (Ct. App. 1986) (the
exclusion of black women based upon their age was reasonable because prosecutor also challenged elderly white female jurors); Staley v. State, 582 A.2d 532,
536 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (age was valid race-neutral basis), cert denied, 587
A.2d 247 (1990); People v. Kindelan, 572 N.E.2d 1138, 1142-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(youthfulness of juror was valid basis for peremptory strike). However, because
the use of age as a racially neutral basis is "inherently susceptible to abuse,"
care should be used to ensure that age is directly connected to some important
aspect of the litigant's case. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
135. Thomas v. State, 555 So. 2d 320, 321-22 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (preference for single jurors permissible explanation); Pritchett v. State, 548 So. 2d 509,
510 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (same).
136. See United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153,1157 (3d Cir. 1989) (prosecutor expressed some uncertainty over a juror's religious beliefs (Hinduism)).
See also People v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (juror's
strong religious beliefs permissible explanation); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d
440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Grady v. State, 730 S.W.2d 191, 194-95 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (juror failed to list a religious preference on questionnaire and attorney claimed he preferred jurors with religious preferences), vacated, 761 S.W.2d
19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Rasco v. State, 739 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) (where excused juror was a Baptist minister).
137. See United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir.), (prospective juror had acquitted a defendant prosecuted by the same attorney in an earlier case), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989). People v. Chambie, 234 Cal. Rptr.
308, 311 (Ct. App. 1987) (excluded juror had previously served on panel which
acquitted a defendant in a case tried by the same prosecutor); People v. Walker,
547 N.E.2d 1036, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (prospective juror's prior vote of not
guilty in a criminal trial four years earlier was a valid basis for excluding that
juror).
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Any statement or answer by a juror during voir dire that is
false,1 38 equivocal or raises a question about a juror's ability to accept the type of evidence that will be presented, 139 or a juror's ability to be fair and impartial, also constitute permissible explanations
for purposes of a Batson challenge. 140 This remains true even
when that juror states that he can set aside those experiences in his
background and be fair and impartial to both of the parties.' 4 1
Courts have also recognized that "non-verbal communication"
42
by a juror, such as the prospective juror's posture and demeanor,
failure to make eye contact,1 43 "hostile" expression, 144 or "casual
manner" 145 can also provide a legitimate basis for excusing that juror. A juror's hesitancy in answering questions is also a racially
138. Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ga. 1988) (where juror's denials of
having a friend or relative accused or convicted of a crime or knowing anyone
with a drug or alcohol problem found to be untrue).
139. See People v. Davis, 234 Cal. Rptr. 859, 870-71 (Ct. App. 1987) (juror felt
"direct" evidence should be given more weight than circumstantial evidence despite the court's instruction to weigh them equally); People v. Chambie, 234 Cal.
Rptr. 308, 313 (Ct. App. 1987) (juror stated doubts about proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard); State v. Woodruff, 387 S.E.2d 453, 454 (S.C. 19S9) (hesitancy in answers about willingness to impose death sentence).
140. People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Ill. 1989) (juror's answers to
questions about death penalty "did not appear candid" found to be a permissible
explanation), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
141. See Adams v. State, 740 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). In Adams, a
prospective juror stated she could disregard her friendship with the defendant's
mother and would not allow that relationship to affect her deliberations. The
court's holding implicitly establishes that the prosecutor was entitled to disbelieve the prospective juror, and the prospective juror's disclaimer did not establish that the attorney excusing the juror had unacceptable motives. The court
held the exclusion was proper. Id. at 62. See also People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d
849, 866 (IM. 1990) (prospective juror stated unsolved crime might affect her
impartiality, and was properly excluded despite quick self-correction), vacated
on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991).
142. People v. Murff, 574 N.E.2d 815, 819 (IM.App. Ct. 1991) (juror's forceful
demeanor and perceived hostility toward the State); People v. Harris, 544
N.E.2d 357, 380 (IM.1989) (meek and sleepy juror who did not answer questions
in a forthright manner), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990); People v. Kindelan,
572 N.E.2d 1138, 1143-44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (demeanor and tone of voice indicated juror considered jury duty an imposition); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d
440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (juror's "Body English").
143. United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987) (juror
failed to make eye contact with attorney); State v. Tubbs, 747 P.2d 1232, 1236-37
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (lack of eye contact and possibility that juror had formerly
worked for defendant's employer); Mack, 538 N.E.2d at 1111 (juror failed to
make eye contact with attorney); People v. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App.
Ct.) (juror continually looked at the defendant and avoided looking at the judge
during voir dire), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1990).
144. Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644,648 (11th Cir. 1990) (permitting
exclusion based upon juror's hostile expression towards defendant and defense
counsel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2263 (1991); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d
1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) (juror sat with arms crossed and appeared hostile).
145. People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 699 (Ill.) (prospective juror's hesitant
and casual demeanor), appeal denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
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neutral explanation under Batson.146 Several jurisdictions, while
accepting peremptory challenges based upon "demeanor" and
'body language," have also noted that these types of subjective explanations can serve as a pretext for racial discrimination and have
warned trial courts to closely scrutinize them.147
Courts have accepted explanations which are based on a perceived lack of commitment by a given juror or a juror's inability to
appreciate the seriousness of his role in the trial process. 148 Other
decisions have also approved the exclusion of a juror who was perceived as lacking the necessary intellectual capacity for jury service. 14 9 Counsel who choose to justify a peremptory strike on these

grounds should take care to adequately make the appropriate record and, if possible, should rely upon specific responses from the
146. See State v. Castillo, 731 P.2d 983,985-86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (hesitancy
and juror did not appear to understand the proceedings); Hooper,552 NX.2d at
699; People v. Jones, 541 N.E.2d 161, 167 (M. App. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 548
N.E.2d 1074 (M. 1990). However, counsel should be aware that a court does not
direct the "crucial inquiry" simply toward whether a juror hesitates in answering questions or toward the number of questions to which the juror hesitates,
but instead directs the inquiry toward whether the juror displays a bias against
one of the parties through the manner by which he answers questions. Jones,
541 N.E.2d at 167.
147. See People v. Charron, 238 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Ct. App. 1987) (the court
stated, "prosecutors purporting to rely solely on their interpretation of body
language, gestures, and glances, do so at their peril"). See also People v. Murff,
574 N.E.2d 815, 819 (M. App. Ct. 1991) (juror's "forceful demeanor" may constitute a racially neutral basis for exclusion; however, explanations focusing on
demeanor must be closely scrutinized by trial court). But see People v. Talley,
504 N.E.2d 1318,1327-28 (M. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that a prosecutor's explanation that he "was not too happy with [the prospective juror's] demeanor and
how he answered questions" was a sufficient race-neutral explanation), appeal
denied, 537 N.E.2d 817 (1989).
148. People v. Jackson, No. 68012, 1991 M. LEXIS 83, at *74 (Sept. 8, 1991)
(prospective juror who "nodded off" during the reading of the charges was
properly excluded); People v. Thomas, 559 N.E.2d 262, 266 (Ill. App. Ct.) (prospective juror was an "unwed mother" and thus, lacked the "moral fiber" necessary to be a juror in a criminal case), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 846 (M. 1990),
cort. denied, No. 90-7173 1991 U.S. LEXIS 4573 (Oct. 7, 1991); Ivatury v. State,
792 S.W.2d 845, 847-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (juror validly excused who "dozed
off" during voir dire). See also People v. Melchor, 535 N.E.2d 1082, 1085-86
(1989) (juror's youth and lack of sufficient education was such that he could not
appreciate the seriousness of the crime). Contra State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265,
272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (juror's looking at floor and tardiness were held to be
questionable explanations for excusing juror).
149. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 559 N.E.2d 112, 115-17 (11M.
App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 561 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1990); Allen v. State, 811 S.W.2d 673, 676-77 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991) (juror's difficulty with writing as evidenced by an inability to fill out
a juror questionnaire card), Hastings v. State, 755 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988) (juror's low intelligence). See also United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334,
337 (7th Cir. 1988) (prospective jurors could be validly excused in favor of those
,ith "education and business experience"), cer denied, Bell v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 143 (1989). But see People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 108 (Cal. 1986)
(finding explanation not bona fide that a truck driver was incapable of comprehending evidence in a complex case, when nothing indicated juror lacked the
necessary intelligence).
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juror during voir dire, or from the juror questionnaire form, that
supports their perceptions about that given juror.1'0 If the case will
involve complex scientific or medical evidence, counsel should
bring this information to the attention of the trial court, since it
bolsters counsel's explanations based on the perceived intelligence
level of an excused juror. Similarly, several opinions have held that
parties may still validly exercise peremptory challenges against jurors who suffer from physical conditions that might impair their
ability to perceive the evidence to serve on a jury.' 51
If counsel has a strategy or game plan for the selection of a
particular jury or has an "ideal juror profile," he should be prepared to describe this for the court if its disclosure will not necessarily reveal his trial strategies. 152 Counsel should be prepared to
furnish any past experiences that support his stated reasons for excluding a juror. If, however, the "game plan" for jury selection or
the type of juror sought in the case on trial would tend to reveal
trial strategies, counsel should request an ex parte-in camera hear153
ing with the court.
EXPLANATIONS HELD NOT TO BE RACIALLY NEUTRAL
Three criteria are generally utilized in determining whether a
given explanation is deemed racially neutral. These criteria are:
whether the reason given for the exclusion is specific; whether it is
rationally related to juror bias or other characteristics affecting a
150. See People v. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d 1060,1069 (Ill.
App. Ct.) (juror omitted
eight responses on juror information card), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 840 (11.
1990); People v. Jones, 559 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Ill. App. Ct.) (inconsistencies between a juror's voir dire statements and responses contained on jury information card permitted challenges), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 700 (Ill.
1990). See
also Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497, 502 (Nev. 1987) (juror answered "unmarried"
on information sheet but indicated during voir dire that she was married).
151. See United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 1990) (juror
had difficulty hearing); People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380 (Ill. 1989) (juror
was "sickly and disabled" and was therefore not able to pay attention throughout the trial), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990). But see People v. Green, 561
N.Y.S.2d 130, 131-33 (Civ. Ct. 1990) (peremptory challenge of deaf person solely
on the basis of his disability violated juror's right to equal protection under the
New York Constitution).
152. See People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1113 (Ill. 1989) (state explained
that its juror profile excluded "young jurors" who rented rather than owned
their homes), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990); Townsend v. State, 730 S.W.2d
24, 26 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (prosecutor's attempts to strike all young people
including blacks, in favor of those with stronger ties to the community is a racially neutral explanation). See also People v. Gregory, 527 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875
(1987) (minority jurors who failed to meet juror profile validly excused so long
as non-minority jurors also challenged for same reason).
153. United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 338-40 (7th Cir. 198,Q, cert denied,
Bell v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 143 (1989). See also infra notes 191-204 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the potential disclosure of attorney's
notes and the requirement of sworn testimony of attorneys in a Batson hearing.
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juror's qualifications; and whether the reason is given in good faith
or is bona fide.1 5 If these criteria are fulfilled, a court will find that
the reason justifying the exercise of the peremptory challenge is
racially neutral.
An attorney's claims of good faith or absence of discriminatory
purpose will not overcome a prima facie showing of Batson violation.155 An explanation must refer to specific factors concerning
the challenged juror's background.' 1 6 Otherwise, the explanation
will be insufficient to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination.157 For example, one attorney's explanation was found inadequate when he explained that "based upon [the juror's] background
and other things in his questionnaire, I just elected to strike
him.' ' 158 The court held that the explanation failed to rebut his opponent's prima facie case because the record contained nothing specific about the contents of the questionnaire or the juror's
15 9
background other than the juror was an Native American.
Courts have held explanations that a particular juror might be
sympathetic or more inclined to favor one party over another due to
their shared "race" or ethnic heritage are not good faith justifications for excusing that juror.160 Any suggestion that a particular
juror or group of jurors would be biased toward one of the parties or
his counsel also constitutes an impermissible explanation under
Batson.161 Similarly, a party may not rebut an assertion of discrimi154. People v. Hall, 672 P.2d 854, 858 (Cal. 1983).
155. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 379 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1323 (1990); People v. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d 1060, 1068 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 840 (I. 1990).
156. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d at 1068; Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 228 (8th
Cir. 1987) (general explanations such as a juror's "background" and "lifestyle"
are inadequate, as is the notion that knowledge of "electronics," "bookkeeping"
or "computers" might prevent a juror from accepting the standard of proof requirement). But see State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 23 (Fla.), cert denied, 487
U.S. 214 (1988) ("political liberals" more likely to be lenient to defendants than
conservatives, and finding "liberalism" neutral and reasonable explanation).
157. Harris,544 N.E.2d at 384. See also Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F.
Supp. 890, 893-94 (D. Conn. 1986).
158. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1312 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988).
159. Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1312. See also People v. Turner, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656
(1986) (statement to the effect by counsel that "it was something in [the juror's]
work ... that from [the State's] standpoint, that background... would not be
good for [the State's] case" was held to be so lacking in content that it failed to
rebut the defendant's prima fade case).
160. See, e.g., Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(plaintiff suggested that black juror's membership in the Urban League of Chicago indicated the juror was interested in helping minorities and, therefore,
would be partial to black defendants), mandamus granted, Maloney v.
Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988) (mandamus issued because trial court imposed improper remedy for Batson violation).
161. See Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (D. Conn. 1986)
In Clark, a city attorney explained that black jurors were excused because
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nation on the ground that he "does not know why" he exercised the
peremptory challenge. 162 An attorney c.annot justify the exclusion
of a class of jurors because his opponent intentionally struck another ethnic group from the panel.1a6
The trial court, in determining whether the explanations are
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case, must make a "sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the attorney's explanation" based on the
facts of the case, as well as the trial judge's experience and observation of the voir dire.164 The issue is not necessarily whether the
attorney's opinion about a given juror or ethnic group is correct.
Rather, the issue in a Batson hearing is whether the attorney's good
faith belief, rather than a racially discriminatory motive, was the
actual motivation behind the exercise of the peremptory challenge.165 This remains true even though the court may not necessarily agree with the attorney's subjective beliefs about the
particular class of jurors.166
"they were biased," "they would show prejudice," "they would give him a fair
trial," and "I don't have any empirical data. All I can tell you is I trust my
instincts." Id. The court held that these reasons were not racially-neutral and
were insufficient to overcome a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent in
the exercise of peremptory challenges. Id. See also United States v. Brown, 817
F.2d. 674, 676 (10th Cir. 1987) (condemning presumption that a black attorney
would have unfair advantage with black jurors).
162. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. See also People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 383 (fI1.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. CL 1323 (1990). In Harris, however, the court ap-

proved a challenge when the attorney did not have sufficient information about
the juror to feel comfortable with her remaining on the jury. Id.

163. People v. Pagel, 232 Cal. Rptr. 104,107-09 (1986) (attorney's exclusion of

blacks because opposing attorney was deliberately challenging white jurors was
held to be an invalid justification for the challenges).
164. People v. Hall, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 75 (1983).
165. See People v. Thomas, 559 N.E.2d 262, 266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) cert. denied, No. 90-7173 1991 U.S. LEXIS 4573 (Oct. 7, 1991). In Thomas, the court
characterized a statement about unwed mothers lacking the "moral fiber" necessary to serve on a jury as "an unfortunate and narrow-minded prejudice" but
nevertheless affirmed the trial court's finding that the reason was not a mere
pretext for racial discrimination. Id. See also United States v. Clemmons, 892
F.2d 1153, 1157 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2623 (1991). In Clemmons,
the prosecutor did not believe that the challenged juror was black, but rather
Asian-Indian and excused him because of uncertainty about his Hindu religious
beliefs. The court held that even if the juror was black there was no Batson
violation since the explanation showed prosecutor did not discriminate against
juror because of his race. Id
166. See People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 380-81 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied 110 S.
Ct. 1323 (1990). In Harris,the prosecutor explained that he excused a juror
because that juror resided in Hyde Park, an area whose residents are more
scholarly and, therefore, more open to new ideas than other Chicagoans. The
Illinois Supreme Court considered this explanation to be non-racial in nature.
Id. The trial judge had attended law school and had worked for a number of
years in the Hyde Park area and concluded on the record that there was some
basis for the State's assumption about the neighborhood's residents. Id. Absent
such a statement by the trial court, however, the HarrisCourt indicated that it
may have found such an explanation to be a "mere pretext," since it did not
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When a party seeks to justify the exclusion of a prospective juror due to that juror's membership in a particular "group," e.g., accountants, there are several important factors which the trial court
should evaluate. One consideration is whether the court believes
that the "group" as a whole possesses the trait that counsel has
given as his justification for challenging a juror, e.g., accountants
tend to be politically liberal. Another factor is whether the prospective juror himself actually possesses that undesirable trait.
If the trial court feels that the "group" as a whole does not exhibit the "claimed" trait, it would be justified in finding that the
explanation was not bona fide. 167 Similarly, a trial court could
properly find that the proffered explanation was a pretext for discrimination if the individual juror did not possess the undesirable
trait, even though the group as a whole might exhibit that characteristic.1' Whenever possible, trial counsel should obtain an affirmation or admission from opposing counsel or the trial judge
concerning the characteristic or factor that justified a juror's exclusion. Such an acknowledgement might convince a reviewing court
to accept the justification given when the record is weak or when
1 69
the appellate court might be otherwise hesitant to do SO.
ANALYSIS FOLLOWING REBUTTAL OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE
Once an attorney has rebutted his opponent's prima facie case,
the burden of proof shifts back to the party who initially raised the
challenge. 7 0° At this stage of the proceedings, the party who initially raised the Batson challenge must demonstrate that the explanations justifying the removal of a juror were a "mere pretext" for
racial discrimination. The trial court, at this point, must determine
whether the party raising the challenge has established purposeful
discrimination
notwithstanding
the asserted
race-neutral
explanation. 17 1
Counsel may meet this burden by demonstrating that the challenged group of jurors included men and women who were of a va172
riety of ages, occupations and educational backgrounds.
necessarily agree with the prosecutor's conclusions about the neighborhood's

residents. Id.
167. Id168. IcL
169. See, e.g., Cnemmons, 892 F.2d at 1160 (trial judge stated that the juror did

not appear to be black, but rather [Asian-Indian); Harris,544 N.E.2d at 380-81

(trial judge stated that there was some basis for the prosecutor's assumption
about Hyde Park residents, and reviewing court accepted this analysis).
170. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986); Salazar v. Texas, 795 S.W.2d
187, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

171. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
172. See People v. Moss, 233 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (two

excluded jurors showed few characteristics other than their race); State v. Gil-
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Typically, a party will compare the characteristics of the excluded
jurors with those who were selected 173 in an attempt to prove that
the jurors who were selected shared the same traits that were given
as explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges against
those jurors who were excluded. 174
The jury selection process, however, involves a multi-faceted
analysis that requires a trial attorney to continually evaluate various factors and information concerning each potential juror. The
attorney's ideal juror may vary widely from case to case depending
upon the facts involved; the attorney's theory of liability or defense;
and the characteristics of the parties. There are a number of decisions that recognize the complex nature of the process and acknowledge that a given characteristic or trait in one juror's makeup
might be out-weighed by other factors in another juror's background.175 Trial counsel should be prepared to discuss the multifaceted nature of the decision making process involved in selecting
a jury and steer the court away from point-by-point comparisons
176
between the excluded and accepted jurors.
more, 511 A.2d 1150, 1168 (N.J. 1986) (only difference between excluded and
accepted jurors was their race).
173. See State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (trial court
should first determine whether similarly situated white jurors were stricken on
identical or comparable grounds).
174. See Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 621-26, 626 n.13 (Ala. 1987); People
v. Hall, 672 P.2d 854, 858-59 (Cal. 1983) (comparing jurors rejected with those
accepted); Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 795-96 (Ga. 1987) (rejected-accepted
comparison appropriate); People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 1989) (comparison of rejected with accepted jurors should be given great weight); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986) (court expressed a preference for rejectedaccepted comparison of jurors, rather than rejected-rejected comparison).
175. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983); People v. McDonald,
530 N.E.2d 1351, 1358-59 (Ill. 1988). For example, in People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d
453 (Il. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3290, the Illinois Supreme Court noted:
Though a part of the prosecutor's explanations may have been applicable to
white jurors who were not challenged, the white jurors may have, in some
other respect, exhibited a trait which the prosecutor reasonably could have
believed would have made him or her desirable as a juror.
Id. at 458-59. Similarly, in People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357 (111. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323 (1990), the Illinois Supreme Court observedLikewise, the converse is true as well. Though a minority venireperson
may otherwise possess all the traits which the State is looking for in a juror,
he may possess an additional trait which makes him undesirable.
Id. at 382.
176. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849 (Il. 1990),
vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991) noted that:
A large number of factors can enter into decisions to exercise peremptory
challenges that are not susceptible of point-for-point comparison with decisions not to exercise them. 'If a prosecutor excused one person and not
another it does not follow that this in itself shows that the prosecutor's
explanations were pretextual.'
Id. at 867 (quoting People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 453, 458 (1989), cert denied, 110
S. Ct. 3290 (1990)).
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In addition, factors such as: the number of peremptory challenges available; the number of challenges that have been exhausted; and, the stage of the selection process at which the
challenge was used are relevant considerations in determining
17 7
whether there was a discriminatory motive behind a challenge.
An attorney may rebut a prima facia case of discrimination if he can
demonstrate that he could have exercised available peremptory
challenges against "minority jurors" and did not do so.178 Likewise,
an attorney should be able to overcome a prima facie case if counsel
did not have enough peremptory challenges to remove "non-minority jurors" who had the same or similar background to the excluded
jurors.179
The listing of multiple explanations justifying the exclusion of
a given juror should increase the chances of defeating a Batson challenge. Multiple explanations make possible the argument that,
while a challenged juror possessed some of the traits which a selected juror exhibited, there were additional factors which made
the juror undesirable. For example, in one case,180 the State based
several peremptory challenges on the age of a particular juror and
his or her status as a renter rather than a homeowner.' 8 l In response, the defense argued that the State did not exclude five white
jurors who were of a similar age and did not exclude nine jurors
who rented rather than owned their homes.'8 2 The prosecutors
then pointed out that all of the minority jurors excluded on those
bases were both young and rented their homes whereas only one of
83
the white jurors possessed a similar combination of these factors.
The reviewing court felt that this lent credence to the State's claim
that "it preferred persons who were older and who owned their
homes to persons who were younger and rented their homes."'1 4
The furnishing of multiple explanations justifying a peremptory
challenge is likely to expand trial counsel's ability to rebut his opponent's assertions of discrimination in the jury selection process.
177. See, e.g., Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 647-49 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2263 (1991); Branch, 526 So. 2d at 623..
178. People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 701 (Ill.
1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.

284 (1990). See also Barfield, 911 F.2d at 647-49.
179. See People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 382 (IlM. 1989), cert denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1323 (1990) (where the State had excluded black school teachers and their
spouses and had no challenges left to exercise against white school teacher was
held a valid race-neutral explanation). See also Barfield, 911 F.2d at 647-49.
180. People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (Ill.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093
(1990).
181. Id. at 1113.
182. Id
183. Id.
184. Id.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court's determinations in a Batson hearing are findings of fact which turn largely on questions of credibility. Therefore, a state trial court's ruling in a Batson hearing will not be
overturned unless it is "against the manifest weight of the evidence."las In federal courts, the trial judge's determinations in a
Batson hearing will not be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous."18 6 These standards apply even when the judge holding the
Batson hearing is different than the trial judge before whom voir
187
dire was originally conducted.
Since the trial judge participates in voir dire and has the opportunity to question the prospective jurors and observe their demeanor as well as the attorneys, the trial court's ruling in a Batson
hearing is given "great deference" by reviewing courts.18s Oftentimes, of a juror's idiosyncracies will be apparent to anyone observing the voir dire, but will not appear on the record for a reviewing
court.' 8 9 Therefore, a reviewing court should not substitute its
judgment and reverse the trial court's findings, "even though it may
be convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would
have weighed the evidence differently." 190
SWORN TESTIMONY NOT REQUIRED

A Batson hearing does not require trial-type procedures such as
the introduction of sworn testimony and cross-examination of the
attorneys involved in voir dire.' 9 ' An attorney's unsworn statement as an officer of the court should be sufficient evidence to re185. People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684, 698 (Ill. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
284 (1990); People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357 (Ill.
1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
1323 (1990); People v. McDonald, 530 N.E.2d 1351, 1358 (Ill. 1988).
186. United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1366 (l1th Cir. 1990). See also
United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1487 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
173 (1990) (appellants carry a heavy burden in challenging the findings of the
lower courts).
187. People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (111. 1989) cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1093 (1990).
188. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 76, 97-98 (1986). See also United States v.
Grandison, 885 F.2d 143, 149 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding the trial court's finding
of no prima facie case of discrimination); People v. King, 241 Cal. Rptr. 189, 19495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (courts are especially likely to accord great deference to
the trial court when the case is a "close one"); Bradley v. State, 562 So. 2d 1276,
1283 (Miss. 1990).
189. People v. Thompson, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, (App. Div. 1981).
190. People v. Hooper, 552 N.E.2d 684 (Ill. 1990) (citing Anderson v. City of
Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
191. United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 130 (4th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1988); People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 453
(Ill. 1989).
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but his opponent's prima facie case. 192 Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Hernandez v. New York' 93 amplified the
Court's concern that a Batson hearing should not be turned "into a
full blown disparate impact trial, with statistical evidence and expert testimony" on issues involving the alleged discriminatory practices of one of the parties. 194
If a prima facie violation is established, counsel should resist
any suggestion that he be required to swear an oath before offering
explanations to justify the use of his peremptory challenges. This
might subject him to cross-examination by opposing counsel as well.
Although a number of decisions have noted that the attorneys were
sworn in before giving their explanations, 195 a number of courts
have rejected proposals that would require an attorney be sworn
and made subject to cross-examination during a Batson hearing. 19
Those courts have held that an attorney's representations are sufficient evidence for purposes of a Batson hearing as to why a peremptory challenge was exercised.
ATTORNEY NOTES
It is within the discretion of the trial court to order production
of an attorney's notes that were made during voir dire.1 97 However,
the vast majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have
found that an attorney's notes are protected from disclosure under
a "work product" doctrine.'9 8 This is especially true when a tran192. Mack, 538 N.E.2d at 1117.
193. 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1873 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

194. I& at 1874 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor added that
such a procedure would be "antithetical to the nature and purpose of the peremptory challenge." Id195. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
affd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988). See also People v. McDonald, 530 N.E.2d 1351,
1355 (Ill. 1988); Hawkins v. State, 793 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
196. See State v. Jackson, 368 S.E.2d 838, 84142 (N.C. 1988) (holding that a
defendant does not have a right to cross examine a prosecutor and require him
to explain his reasons for a peremptory challenge), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110
(1989). See also People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 453, 459-60 (IM. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 3290 (1990).
197. People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1115 (IMI. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1093 (1990); Guilder v. State, 794 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (determination
of what materials are discernable by a party raising a Batson challenge committed to the discretion of the trial court).
198. Macc, 538 N.E.2d at 1115-16. See also Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188 (Ga.
1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1085 (1989); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo.
1987) (en banc); Guilder v. State, 794 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). One of
the few decisions that appears to have ordered production of an attorney's notes
is Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 1987 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990), which required their
production under Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 611, after an attorney used his notes to
refresh his recollection as to the reasons why he exercised a challenge. However, two later cases from that jurisdiction avoided the production issue by finding that the issue had been waived when the notes were not made a part of the
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script of the voir dire is available, since any notation by counsel,
other than a juror's voir dire answers, would constitute counsel's
theories, opinions or conclusions.'9
An attorney's notes can be used to rebut a defendant's prima
facie showing of discrimination.2 ° The disclosure of an attorney's
notes will not n c-essarily be required even if the trial court relies
on them in ruling on a Batson challenge.20 1 In an appropriate case,
the court may allow a party to rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination by providing an in camera ex parte explanation in the

form of oral statements or written materials.20 2 The use of ex-parte
procedures are particularly appropriate where an attorney's justification for a given challenge would require disclosure of trial strategies or other information which might hinder his ability to fairly
203
present his case.
While the vast majority of decisions addressing this issue have
not required the production of an attorney's notes, they are potentially discoverable and, more importantly, can be used to rebut an
opponent's prima facie case. An attorney's notes could be of critical
importance should an appellate court remand a matter, and counsel
is forced to explain the reasons behind a peremptory challenge several years later. Therefore, counsel should consider taking notes
during the jury selection. During voir dire, trial counsel should record specific factors about a particular juror's demeanor and manner
of answering questions which might serve as a basis for challenging
that juror.
There is a plethora of books and articles addressing non-verbal

communication in the courtroom which trial counsel should be familiar. Any negative or unfriendly "indicators" exhibited by a ju .r

during voir dire should be recorded in an attorney's notes so that he
will be able to make an adequate record should he need to describe
the aspect of a juror's demeanor caused him to exercise a perpemp20 4
tory challenge.

record for their review. See Hawkins v. State, 793 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990); Gaines v. Texas, 811 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
199. Mack, 538 N.E.2d at 1115-16.
200. Id.
201. United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334,338-40 (7th Cir. 1988), cert denied,
109 S. Ct. 3154 (1989).
202. United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 131-32 (4th Cir. 1988) (in camera
inspection of attorney's notes held justified where notes contained trial strategy), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989); United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194,
1200-03 (6th Cir.) (in camera inspection held justified), cert denied, 483 U.S.
1007 (1987). But see United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1259-61 (9th Cir.
1987) (in camera inspection held to be an abuse of discretion).
203. See United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 131-32 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).

204. Typical negative or unfriendly indicators include: eye contact of short
duration or averted eyes; unpleasant facial expressions; rigid body position; a

1991]

Edmonson: Will the Peremptory Challenge Survive?
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO CONTEST THE USE OF PEREMPTORY

CHALLENGES
It is critical that motions addressing the discriminatory use of a
peremptory challenge be made promptly.20 5 Challenges to the com-

position of a jury must be raised before the jury is sworn.-20 If a
party does not contest the exercise of a peremptory challenge until
after a jury has been sworn, the party has waived the issue, and it
may not be raised on appeal.2° 7 On the other hand, if an attorney
defending a Batson claim fails to argue the waiver issue before the
trial court, he will be estopped from arguing the untimeliness of his
opponent's Batson challenge on appeal. 20 8
MAKING THE RECORD

A party cannot challenge his opponent's peremptory strikes as
being racially motivated unless there is evidence in the record establishing the race or ethnicity of the excluded juror.2° 9 Several
courts have gone so far as to hold that a party waives its Batson
closed body position such as arms folded, clenched fists, and indirect body orientation. For further information on non-verbal communication in the courtroom
see, e.g., JUDEE K BURGOON & THOMAS SAINE, TnE UNSPOKEN DIALoGUE AN
INTRODUCTION TO NoN-VERBAL COMMUNICATION (1978); PAUL EKMAN & WALLACE FRIESEN, UNMASKING THE FACE: A GUIDE TO RECOGNIZING EMOTIONS
FROM FACIAL EXPRESSION (1975); GERALD NIERENBERG & CALERO, How TO
READ A PERSON LIKE A BOOK (1973); THOMAS SANNrro & PETR MCGOVERN,
COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY FOR TRIAL LAWYERS (1985).

205. Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 1987) (plaintiff waved objection
to the exclusion of male jurors in a civil action, by failing to make a contemporaneous objection before trial court). See also Weekly v. State, 496 N.E.2d 29, 31
(Ind. 1986) (party waived constitutional issue by making only an objection without stating the reasons or underlying basis).
206. People v. Evans, 530 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 (Ill. 1988), cert denied, 490 U.S.
1113 (1989). See also United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 667-68 (5th Cir.) (motion to strike was untimely when made before the jury was empaneled but
more than one week after the peremptory challenges had been exercised and
the remaining venire excused), cert denied, 479 U.S. 991 (1986); Munn v. Alger,
730 F. Supp. 21, 29 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (court found that a party waived his Batson
challenge when the issue was raised for the first time during post-trial motions), vffd, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 4951
(1991); Clark v. State, 562 So. 2d 620, 624 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (defendant
waived Batson objection when motion was not made until after opening statements); State v. Harris, 754 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Ariz. 1988) (defendant waived Batson objection where motion was made after jury was sworn and stricken jurors
were excused).
207. United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1987). See also
State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (once a jury has been
empaneled and accepted, a party will not be heard to complain of the make-up
of its panel).
208. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 378 (Ill. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
1323 (1990); State v. Lee, 747 S.W.2d 57, 58-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
209. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 378 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1323 (1990); People v. Evans, 530 N.E.2d 1360,1364-65 (Ill. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1113 (1989). See also People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 753 n.1 (Cal. 1978)
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objection if it fails to obtain a transcript of the voir dire. 21 0 In one
reported decision,2 11 the parties stipulated that five jurors stricken
by the State had been black. The defendant also claimed on appeal
that the exclusion of a sixth juror was racially motivated. 21 2 The
court held, however, that the defendant waived his claim concerning the sixth juror because there was no evidence in the record that
21 3
identified that juror's race.
It is error for a trial court to go beyond the record to determine
the race of a disputed juror.21 4 In another decision, it was noted
that the trial court should have considered only the State's exclusion of those members of the venire that the parties had agreed
were black in determining whether the defendant had established a
prima facie case of discrimination.2 1 5 However, a reviewing court is
"plainly entitled" to consider an attorney's statements at a Batson
hearing to determine the race of an excluded juror.2 16
Trial counsel wishing to raise a Batson challenge must be ready
to establish the racial or ethnic composition of the venire, as well as
the "race" of the excluded and selected jurors. In addition, counsel
should be prepared to demonstrate common characteristics or traits
between the excluded and selected jurors and if relevant, the racial
or ethnic backgrounds of the parties, the witnesses and the attorneys involved.
Most of the necessary information can be established simply
through juror questionnaire cards that can be introduced into the
record. In addition, stipulations or agreements of counsel can estab2 17
lish a sufficiknt appellate record.
One practical problem for trial counsel and the court is attempting to determine the particular ethnic group that a juror belongs to. A number of courts have relied upon the surnames of the
(demonstrating how counsel may establish race of a juror to provide an adequate record).

210. See, e.g., Jackson v. Housing Auth., 364 S.E.2d 416, 417 (N.C. 1988); Reed
v. State, 751 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (Batson challenges cannot be
reviewed in the absence of the complete voir dire examination).

211. Evans, 530 N.E.2d at 1364-65.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357,378-79 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied,110 S. Ct.
1323 (1990).
215. Id. at 378-79.
216. See People v. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d 1060, 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal
denied, 564 N.E.2d 840 (Ill. 1990); Stanley v. State, 542 A.2d 1267, 1274 (Md.
1988), appeal afterremand,582 A.2d 532 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990), cert, denied,

587 A.2d 247 (Md. 1991).
217. People v. Evans, 530 N.E.2d 1360, 1367 (Ill. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1113 (1989). See People v. Baisten, 560 N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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juror.2 18 As noted earlier, the surname of a juror is not necessarily
a true indicator of his ethnic heritage, and counsel opposing a Batson challenge should not presume simply on the basis of a jurors'
surname that he or she belongs to a given ethnic group. Counsel
should be ready to argue that without more information in the record his opponent has not demonstrated that the juror was a member of a given ethnic group and has not met his prima facie
burden.219 Furthermore, counsel should argue that excluded jurors
should not be considered on a "collective" basis unless the petitioner demonstrates that those jurors share the same "ethnic characteristics" or "community of interests." Trial counsel should argue
against the use of group descriptions, such as "Latino" or "Hispanic," which might improperly combine jurors with dissimilar cultural backgrounds. °
Another difficult issue that trial counsel will be left to grapple
with is the growing trend among trial courts to conduct the entire
voir dire. While a trial court's voir dire examination must be sufficient to enable the parties to remove prospective jurors who will
not impartially follow the court's instructions or the evidence, 221 a
trial judge has broad discretion in determining what questions may
be asked during voir dire, and will not be reversed absent an abuse
of that discretion.m Trial counsel may therefore lack the necessary information to properly raise a Batson challenge since the trial
court need not necessarily inquire into the ethnic background of a
prospective juror.
CONSOLIDATED HEARING

A trial court may request an attorney to furnish explanations
why he exercised a peremptory challenge as soon as opposing counsel raises the issue. While counsel may choose to furnish an expla218. Esquavel v. McCotter, 791 F.2d 350, 351 (5th Cir. 1986). But see United
States v. Campiore, 942 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1991) (surname alone is insufficient to show ethnicity).
219. See, e.g., United States v. DiPasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert denied sub. nom., Di Noiscio v. United States, 492 U.S. 906 (1989). United
States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987) (conclusory allegations that persons
with Italian-American surnames belong to a "cognizable" ehnic group held insufficient to establish a prima facie showing), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
220. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
221. United States v. Hasting, 739 F.2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1984).
222. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451

U.S. 182,

188 (1981).

223. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming
the trial court's denial of a defense request to ask prospective Jewish jurors to
identify themselves); United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1990)
(affirming trial court's refusal to inquire about prejudice due to the evidence of
the Black Muslim faith). But see People v. Harris, 544 N.E.2d 357, 383 (Ill. 1989)
(court permitted Batson challenge when attorney did not have sufficient information about a juror to feel comfortable with her on the jury).
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nation at this point in the proceedings, care must be taken so that
the trial judge follows the analytical framework set down by the
Supreme Court in Batson. While any statement an attorney makes
at this stage of the proceedings can be considered by the trial court
in determining whether a party has established a prima facie violation, counsel runs the risk that a reviewing court may remand the
case for a full Batson hearing should it disagree with the trial
court's ruling or with the manner in which the Batson hearing was
held.224
A number of courts have cautioned against the practice of holding a consolidated hearing at the trial court level where attorneys
contemporaneously explain their reasons for the exercise of a peremptory challenge.2 25 Those reviewing courts have indicated a
preference that trial courts follow the "clear delineation" of Batson's analytical steps. 226 For example, one reviewing court, after
determining that the trial judge erred when he ruled that the defendant had not established a prima facie case of discrimination,
noted that "[o]rdinarily, addressing the second question might require remand to the trial court for another Batson hearing in order
to arrive at a new, procedurally correct finding on the ultimate issue of purposeful discrimination, followed by the deferential treatment that we should normally accord such a finding."227
While a plurality of the Court in Hernandez was not troubled
by the consolidated hearing held at the trial court level, the divergence between the plurality and concurring opinions demonstrates
the potential difficulties that a consolidated hearing can pose for a
reviewing court.
In light of the Court's holding in Hernandez that a contemporaneous explanation "moots" the issue of whether a prima facie violation has been established,M trial counsel should insist that the
court first determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination
has been made before requiring an explanation from counsel. If
counsel is forced to make a statement at this time, he should make
224. See People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1990), vacated on othergrounds,
111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991).
225. United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Love, 815 F.2d 53, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cartlidge, 808
F.2d 1064, 1070 (5th Cir. 1987); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988); Gamble
v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. 1987); Weekly v. State, 496 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind. 1986),
State v. Barber, 539 A.2d 76, 77-78 (R.I. 1988).
226. See United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1107-08 (19th Cir. 1991)
(stressing the shifting of the burden of proof); People v. Celsarters, 284 Cal.
Rptr. 410, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (prima facie burden is a distinct .tap which
should be treated as such); People v. Jackson, No. 68012, 1991 Ill. LEXIS 83
(Sept. 26, 1991).
227. People v. Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1990), vacated on other grounds,111
S. Ct. 2792 (1991).
228. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
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clear that his arguments are merely intended to address the issue of
whether a prima facie showing of discrimination has been established. 229 Because the number of peremptory challenges available
in a civil trial is generally less than the number available in a criminal case, the party raising a Batson challenge in a civil case should
have a more difficult time establishing a prima facie violation. Trial
counsel forced to defend a Batson challenge should initially direct
their efforts at convincing the trial court that a prima facie showing
has not been established.
CORPORATE PARTY'S RIGHT

To RAISE A BATSON CHALLENGE

In Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc.,2 30 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a corporate defendant could not raise a Batson claim
since nothing in equal protection jurisprudence suggests a corporation is considered a "suspect class."'231 The court also noted that a
corporation cannot claim that members of its "race" were improperly excluded from jury service. 232 However, following Powers v.
Ohio,23 3 the party raising a Batson challenge no longer needs to be a
member of the same race as the excluded juror. On June 10, 1991,
2 4
the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Dias 3
and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision in EdmonsonSince one of the reasons for allowing the third party equal protection claim in Edmonson was the Court's concern that a selection
procedure that allowed the exclusion of a juror solely on the basis
of a juror's race would undermine public confidence in our system
of justice, it should not matter whether the party raising the Batson
challenge is a individual or a corporation. Following Powers, any
party in a civil action, irrespective of its status, should now have
standing to raise the issue. Therefore, a corporate party should also
be able to raise a Batson challenge.
229. In State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1987), cert denied, 486 US. 1017

(1988), the Missouri Supreme Court held that trial judges should consider explanations given as part of the process for determining whether a prima facie
case of discrimination has been established. Id. at 64. However, in People v.
Hope, 560 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2792 (1991), the Illinois
Supreme Court observed that Missouri appeared to be the only state approving
this procedure. Id. at 861. In Hope, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that
an explanation given at this point in the proceedings could be classified as an
attorney's statement made during voir dire, which Batson permits to be considered. Id.at 866.
230. Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S.Ct.
2791 (1991).

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 1378-79.
Id. at 1379.
111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991).
Sky Chefs, Inc. v. Dias, 111 S.Ct. 2791 (1991).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991).
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CONCLUSION

Peremptory challenges, like the governmental policies Lincoln
spoke about in 1864, are not "wholly evil." They have played a vital
role in our Anglo-American system of justice for over 300 years.
The Supreme Court, recognizing their historical origins and the important role they serve in the trial process, appears unwilling to
eliminate their use. In Batson, the Supreme Court attempted to
limit the abuse of peremptory challenges, by prohibiting racially
motivated challenges. The Powers, Hernandez, and Edmonson decisions laid out further guidelines to prevent their misuse. Those
decisions represent, as Lincoln put it, the Supreme Court's best
judgment between the unbridled use of peremptory challenges that
trial attorneys have historically enjoyed and their total elimination
that many have argued for. The Batson-Edmonson line of decisions
complicate thie work of the trial attorney in the jury selection process. No longer may attorneys base their decisions about a juror on
"gut reactions." However, with a thorough working knowledge of
the decisional law in the area and an attentive eye and ear, experienced trial counsel should be able to readily justify their actions.

